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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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MONSIGNOR BURTSELL.[1]

Your Eminence, Right Reverend and Reverend Fathers, dearly beloved brethren:—

Scarcely have the echoes of the recent splendid religious festivities died away, when we are called on to mourn the loss of one of the principal priests in this diocese. It was but a short while ago that he quitted this great metropolis, one of the companions of his beloved Archbishop, and went with him to the Apostolic See there to assist at the bestowal of the cardinalitial dignity on the metropolitan of New York. Buoyant and active, despite his age, he seemed the youngest of the large party, and entered fully into the particulars and the spirit of those memorable days at Rome. And again, it was only yesterday that he was one of the chief participators in the magnificent welcome that the citizens of New York gave to their new Cardinal, only yesterday that he walked by his side between the crowded masses of the Catholic faithful, sat beside him in this sanctuary, and thanked God for having ordained all things well for the going and for the coming of your beloved chief pastor, no less than for the high dignity conferred upon him by the See of Peter. And now Monsignor Burtsell is no more.

[1] Discourse preached in St. Patrick's Cathedral, New York, February 10, 1912, by the Right Reverend Rector at the funeral of Right Reverend Richard Lalor Burtsell, pastor of St. Mary's, Kingston, N. Y. Monsignor Burtsell was a distinguished benefactor and friend of the Catholic University.

The time for his reward has come, his hour of peace and rest was near. Mercifully a loving Master gave but a short illness to one who had never known the gradual decay that comes over the frames and the faculties of most men, but had done every day full work in the vineyard of the Lord. Born in this city in 1840, he received his early education in the parochial schools, at St. Francis Xavier's, and at Montreal College in Canada. At the tender age of thirteen he was sent to the Propaganda College at Rome, and during nine years pursued the laborious and profound studies that lead to the Catholic priesthood. He was ordained a priest in 1862, and returned at once to his native city, where for six years he served as assistant pastor of St. Ann's Church, from which office he was called in 1868 to organize the new parish of the Epiphany. He labored in that broad field until 1890, when he became pastor of Saint Mary's, at Rondout, where after another twenty-two years of priestly toil he entered into the rest prepared for those who serve the Divine Master in faith and hope and charity, with singleness of purpose, and with loving upright hearts.

In briefest outline such is the pastoral career of the good priest whose mortal shell, emptied of its bright vivacious spirit,, now lies before us. Had he lived but a few months longer he would have rounded out fifty years of service in the priesthood and taken his place with universal applause among the few glorious veterans of that rank in the Church militant.

But your hearts refuse to be content with such a meagre record of a life so crowded with noble achievements, beneficent deeds, public and private services, that there are few men of his generation to whom ecclesiastical and civil society are so deeply indebted, or whose loss they can with so much difficulty repair. You behold even now the active, scholarly, earnest, resourceful young priest who went about among you building up the Epiphany parish, lifting to God's honor that beautiful edifice, creating the parish school, providing the homes for priests and Sisters, preaching the word of God, the Commandments, the sacramental life, the need and the beauty and the

office of the Catholic Church; visiting the sick, instructing the young and the ignorant, blessing the marriages and hallowing the death-beds of the people; consoling the afflicted, relieving the poor, shedding on all sides the blessings of his ministry, given freely to him by heaven and as freely bestowed upon the vast flock committed to his care. He collected and spent vast sums of money. He was the first to free his splendid church from its burden of debt, he administered wisely the abundant tithe that his beloved people gave out of their toilsome earnings. But all this was as nothing in comparison with his priestly service, the spiritual comforts that he brought to wearied and suffering hearts, the long hours in the confessional, the kindly soothing words of advice, the patient hearing of the tale of woe, old as mankind but forever bitterly new to the unhappy one. What social service is comparable to the daily activities of a good, bright, tactful, sympathetic priest in the highways and the byways of a great modern metropolis? In him Jesus Christ moves among His own; through him they come in contact with the Divine, with goodness and justice and sanctity; through him heaven shines in daily upon their lives, uplifts and comforts them, and assures them of a higher and nobler and eternal order of things. He is indeed a living fountain at which men slake that spiritual thirst which devours all, and unsatisfied is the cause of nearly all our social ills and woes. There is one man at least, who is concerned with the interests, spiritual and temporal, of the community, whose heart is undivided, and whose time and thoughts are all for the beloved people confided to him by God.

Nor were his ministrations confined to the people of his own race and color. His great heart embraced all mankind, and prompted him in the early eighties to establish in this city a church for the colored Catholic population hitherto quite abandoned. I need not recite here his many toils and his great sacrifices for this holy work that was eventually put by him on a firm basis.

Education in all its branches had ever been very dear to Monsignor Burtsell. No interest was dearer to him than the

education of the Catholic clergy. He gave constantly of his means for this good purpose, and among other generous acts may be mentioned the foundation of burses for ecclesiastical students in your own St. Joseph's Seminary and at the Catholic University. He was devoted to the welfare of both of these institutions, knowing well that the spiritual progress of the people depends largely upon the good intellectual and moral training of their priesthood. He was equally concerned about the education of the Catholic children of his parish, and the evidences of it are in the fine schools of the Epiphany and Kingston, no less than in his countless sacrifices and labors to put them on a solid basis and keep them in the front rank of such invaluable institutions.

To his new charge of St. Mary's, Kingston, Monsignor Burtsell brought all the zeal and piety, all the faith and courage, all the frank and direct manliness and all the large sympathies, not to speak of the varied experience, that made him so characteristic a figure in the life of the great city. He repaid amply the hearty welcome of his new flock, soon freed the church from debt, practically rebuilt it, and had it consecrated. And while he ministered to his people with all the affection and regularity of his earlier days, his generous nature prompted him to do abundant social service in the new community which was to profit richly by his active spirit that knew no rest, and was happy only in doing the most good to the greatest number. The public hospital and the public library at Kingston were largely due to his initiative and coöperation. All measures for the public good were sure of his approval and of his practical help. He became the model of a pastor devoted without reserve to every interest of his people, spiritual and temporal. The doing of good was henceforth a passion with him, stamped itself upon his features, shone from his mild eyes, and seemed to radiate from his tall, spare and dignified figure.

His early priesthood was contemporary with no little bitterness of feeling against the Catholic faith, but he lived to witness a profound change in public opinion when on the

occasion of the fortieth anniversary of his ordination all Kingston combined to do him honor as to its foremost citizen. He was, all his life, a model of devotion to civic duties, and gave to them no small portion of his time, his thoughts and his means. His large and comprehensive mind and his great heart were at all times open to plans, ideas, and suggestions whereby the latent forces of the community might be developed for purposes of education or charity or for the general welfare in any and every respect.

He had indeed a great humanitarian heart, though its impulses were admirably guided by his strong Catholic faith, his priestly training, and that large practical experience of popular needs that few ever acquire outside of the parochial priesthood of our great cities. A selfish, indolent, apathetic life was abhorrent to him, nor was he ever happier than in planning some new good work or reviving some older one fallen into decay.

With the Apostle he cherished rightly the good opinion of those who are without the fold, and won in very large measure the confidence and esteem of all non-Catholics with whom he came in contact. They saw in the mild and calm priest a scholar whose learning was varied, deep, and accurate, a gentleman of exquisite manners, courteous and refined, a man of varied culture and rare attainments, who had moved from early youth amid the monuments of history, the treasures of art, the masterpieces of architecture, and who had perfected all these advantages by intelligent travel, close acquaintance with polite literature, and a sincere affectionate regard for all human kind, in itself a most social and elevating trait, and which is nowhere so untrammelled and so natural as in the heart of a virtuous and cultivated minister of the Most High.

And so he is gone from us, the mild and humble priest, the friend and lover of the people, the good citizen, the man of God busied to the end about the service of the Master. But we lose him only for a time, since the true bond between the faithful shepherd and his docile flock is the glorious hope that both shall one day rise again in a city not built of mortal hands

nor governed by the weak and imperfect wisdom of men. He is gone, indeed, but full of days and works and honors, having used to the full his powers and opportunities. The hands are folded in peace once so active. The brain is quiet enough that once teemed with thought. The heart is still that till now beat so steadily and warmly for the good of others. Could he come back to us he would have but one message, that we should remember him always in our prayers and beg of God forgiveness for the human lapses and errors and weaknesses that few children of Adam escape in this hard world, however vigilant and prayerful they may live. For fifty years he offered up daily the holy sacrifice for the spiritual welfare of his people. Let them never forget him, now that he has gone to the eternal home where whole centuries are as a passing moment.

May he soon be gathered to the bosom of that Divine Friend whose faithful servant he was in life, and for whose honor and glory he lived and worked and was glad to die!

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

THE SPIRIT OF MODERNISM.

The particular "Modernism" officially condemned by the Church is not so much the subject of this writing as is that universal modernism of which it seems to be a part, a particular manifestation. For, after all, modernism is becoming to be seen more and more clearly as an attitude not only towards religion but towards everything. In fact, it is something deeper and vaster than a "mental attitude." It is rather a condition of soul of the present-day man from the most cultured professor down to the street-paver and child. It affects every part of him—heart and emotion as much as his thinking: colors every act of his daily existence, his labor and song and art and play and education no less than his religion. Taking the past, chiefly the Medieval past, as a view-point, a sort of "comparative" test, this condition does in innumerable ways seem an unhealthy one. The following pages give the reasons for this opinion. There is, of course an immense amount of good in any civilization, in this particular age perhaps a comparatively unusual amount. But the good is patent and never lacks its exponents. Whereas the evil is always insidious, peculiarly so now because we are blinded by our success. So that, this age, more than any I know of, does really need to be told its faults in the almost desperate hope that with that knowledge it can preserve the good. It is in such a spirit that the following criticisms are offered.

I. The Individual Withers.

Now, as directly compared with a man of the days, say, of Richard Plantagenet, the average modern seems woefully lacking in individuality. Though there is marvellous variety in their activities and even results, yet the men themselves lack

that same variety, because they lack individuality. Peoples are less unlike now than at any period of the race.

To comprehend the justice of this criticism, just remember that our political or civil or social grouping inevitably tends to produce such a result. In the middle ages the grouping was "feudal." That is in small units, restricted areas. True, there was a theoretical vast grouping into what was termed "The Holy Roman Empire," also large groupings into what were more or less called France or England. But the Empire was never more than an imperial dream in practice and those so-called "nations" were, after all, not much more than a loose conglomeration of semi-independent fiefs, with a confusing infinite variety of languages, dialects and customs. Moreover, as travel was so difficult and dangerous, intercourse was vastly more restricted than now. Peoples of even the same country seldom met to exchange ideas except at the great universities or the fairs or the wars or Church councils. Each little city or country-side lived its own peculiar life, receiving and giving little influence so far as its neighbors were concerned.

The consequence was a wonderful, almost bizarre variety, and, therefore, distinctive individuality in Medieval life. There was a strong flavor of "personality" wherever the historian looks into those ages. People seldom copied. They rather seemed to take sheer delight in creating, in doing things each in his own way—be it the building of a church or painting or sculpturing or emblazoning a shield or fashioning his apparel or founding a new religious order. Variety, difference, strong personality everywhere. And because of this, also a grace and charm and joyousness as of men who loved what they did because the creation was part of themselves. Nowhere was there dead monotony, dreary sameness, weary eternal similitude as of men tired of life, of work, of creating, of doing. But a blitheness and vigor and youthful enthusiasm and fearless originality.

How different with us. Our social grouping is on a vast scale, almost worldwide, at least so far as civilized nations are in question, particularly in the United States. Peoples have

gradually coalesced into huge homogeneous bodies politic of millions living under uniform law, speaking identically the same tongue, practising the same customs. The telegraph and the railroad and ocean steamship and newspaper have broken down even the social barrier between these bodies of nations, making them intimately acquainted with one another socially, with one another's literature and ways and possessions. Ibsen is familiar in Boston, Mark Twain in St. Petersburg, The modern American of even small means has trotted from the Hudson to the Himalayas. Lastly, socialism, with its strange gospel of numerical sameness, is helping also to tear down the barriers of difference hitherto distinguishing nations.

And so, as a consequence, strange and disturbing to our pride as it sounds, civilized man today has less real individuality than at any other period of his existence. Peoples are less unlike than ever. We all dress alike whether in New York or London or Paris or Berlin or Rome or Moscow or Madrid or Copenhagen. Everywhere one goes it is pretty much the same old things, except for what relics of Medieval individualism are still left,—the same old hotels, the same rows of monotonous brick houses, same old trains and so forth. Your guide, Mr. Cook, knows everybody. Above all, here in the United States have racial distinctions been boiled together in one huge melting-pot. And I know of no country on the face of the earth which at any time has presented less individuality, less picturesqueness, less personality, less variety, less spontaneity. We all talk alike, think alike (when we do really think, which is not often), dress alike, etc. We Americans, with all our undeniable greatness in some lines, are, nevertheless, the most monotonous set of humans that ever lived. With all our huge population and wealth and physical energy and marvellous resources, we do not right now at this moment create (except in physical science) as much really great things as little Florence was doing under the Medicis. In art, music, literature, philosophy, theology, architecture, in all those things which really do make for life, for the real man, we are slavish copyists or else ridiculous amateurs. And, what is worse yet,

as a result of this monotony we are far from being a happy race as I will point out in detail below. Our very activity in travel and mechanical inventions is, after all, as much a sign of spiritual restlessness as of innate genius. We go, go, go forever at a tremendous pace until the land becomes covered with sanitaria for nerves stretched to the concert-pitch of imminent insanity. "The Individual withers and the world is more and more," sighed Tennyson. And every thinking man hears that sigh echoing in his own disturbed soul. The classic "taedium vitae" is upon us. Spencer's "heterogeneous homogenity" is a fact, and in plain English that means dreary monotony, weariness of soul, loss of that creative individuality and spirituality which alone make life worth living. This is the first characteristic of Modernism—dreary sameness in social life.

II. The Ignoring of Religion.

Ruskin, in a most remarkable way, anticipated Pope Pius X in coining the word "Modernism"—a bit of news, by the way, for those inclined to sneer at the latter's use of it. In his Lecture IV on "Architecture and Painting"—Pre-Raphaelitism—he said boldly: "*Modernism* began and continues wherever civilization began, and continues to deny Christ." I would amend this statement to read thus: "*Modernism* began and continues wherever civilization began and continues to *ignore* not only Christ, but religion itself." For, herein consists one of the most salient and terrible characteristics of the modern spirit—namely, it ignores God practically in the sense that it dissociates religion from its political and social and artistic and commercial life. And so far as I can see, this is something absolutely new in the history of mankind, distinctly Modern. In this sense, I say unhesitatingly that we are the most un-religious race that ever lived, more unreligious than any pagan, savage or cultured. Now, right away I will be told that never before in the world's history were there more people professing Christianity or at least living under its sway.

Also in refutation of the above ridiculous and extravagant statement will be cited the Lord's Day piety of millions of believers; then, too, there are the churches and orphanages and homes for all sorts of afflicted, charity organizations, the boat-loads of Bibles sent to the heathens, etc.

Yes; all very true. But all this does not touch the real point. To understand this, just recall what sort of rôle religion played in pagan Rome and Greece and in Catholic Medievalism, and you will see at a glance what an unimportant one it holds now with us. Now, whether in classic or medieval times religion entered into *every* act of life—that is the point. For illustration, let us consider two aspects of that past life which to the modern man seem to have least connection with religion—art and politics.

Art, therefore, to start with, in classic times was one with art in medieval times in this, that it almost exclusively expressed the faith of the race. Cicero's and Catiline's houses on the Palatine were not adorned with paintings and sculpture of Egyptian or Persian myths, but with the figures of the gods and goddesses which people then believed in. A most idolatrous religion no doubt and most sensual Venuses no doubt. But the point is that the art in their private houses and public places everywhere expressed their faith, their religion, crude however it may have been. Their very Penetralia or household gods ever bore silent witness to the intimate connection existing between their religion and daily, personal, domestic life. Their very temples were hardly more religious in adornment that their actual houses. The statues of Jupiter and Juno and Mercury and a host of lesser deities looked down upon their votaries at work in the Forum or at play in the Circus Maximus. There was not a place nor a season nor an art which was not specifically connected with religion and bore often emphatic testimony to the same in paint or stone.

Herein the Medieval man was more akin to the pagan than the modern, despite the fundamental difference in the kind of religion, because the God, the Christ and the saints, were as

real, as ever present in daily life to him as were Jupiter and Mercury to the classic pagan. If we take art as a test, perhaps they were more real. For your pagan did at times use his art for mundane, often for shamelessly immodest purposes. But the Medieval adhered practically exclusively to the religious expression. And here again the point is that this religious art was not confined to the churches, but everywhere in the street, on a bridge, on the quays, in the public squares, by the county road-sides, in the secret recesses of the homes of both rich and poor—everywhere, with an almost wearying persistence expressed boldly the great Catholic faith of those deeply religious people.

Ruskin in the above quoted lecture so clearly puts this that I quote him in full. Speaking of an order given the Sheriff of Wiltshire to paint the picture of the Blessed Virgin in the bedchamber of young Edward, son of Henry III, he says:

"You see that * * * the furniture of the King's house is made to confess his Christianity. It may be imperfect and impure Christianity, but, such as it might be, it was all that men had then to live and die by; and you see there was not a pane of glass in their windows, nor a pallet by their bedside that did not confess and proclaim it. Now when you go home to your own rooms, supposing them to be richly decorated at all, examine what that decoration consists of. You will find Cupids, Graces, Floras, Dianas, Jupiters, Junos. But you will not find, except in the form of an engraving, bought principally for its artistic beauty, either Christ or the Virgin or Lazarus or Dives. And if a thousand years hence any curious investigator were to dig up the ruins of Edinburgh, and not know your history, he would think you had all been born heathens. *Now that, so far as it goes, is denying Christ; it is pure Modernism.*"

There is the point clearly put. Our art today, outside of our churches, no more expresses our religion than if we had no religion. Or rather it expresses paganism and lascivious paganism at that. The decorations of our hotels would almost rival those of the lupanaria at Pompeii. Our public libraries express the ideas of wisdom and strength and industry, etc., invariably in a nude pagan way. And as for our private residences—Well! I do not know whether to laugh at the incon-

gruity or blush for shame at their brazen decorations. Certainly it is a strange idea of the function of art as an expression of life when even a pious Catholic will have naked Venuses welcoming guests in his hallway and seductive nymphs splashing on the walls of his bath and lascivious Auroras greeting his waking eyes from the frieze of his bed-room. If this be art, then art *is* a curse.

But the point eternally is this, namely, that all this proves what a huge chasm lies between the Modern's religion and his daily thought. In this he is an utterly new personality in the world's history. Never before did man thus dissociate religion from practical life. True! your modern has his religion of some kind or other. But it is a thing apart by itself, ignored except at certain times when there is nothing else to do.

This peculiarity of Modernism is still further exemplified with even more disastrous results in his way of dissociating the State from all religion, something which strikes me as perhaps the most typical achievement of Modernism, its most unique characteristic, for you will not find it before on any page of history.

With all their servile reverence for the State, the classic Greek and Roman and ancient Egyptian or Babylonian were equally convinced that the State should be religious, deeply, intensely so. They seemed utterly unable to conceive of an atheistic State. Hence, the principle obtained universally, "Cujus regio ejus est religio." Such a principle we milk-fed moderns term intolerant. Well! so it was. But it proves more than intolerance. It proves that your pagan had a virile faith and insisted upon that faith permeating and regulating his politics. Hence, he hated the Christian, not so much because the latter followed a Jewish dreamer, for, after all, he did tolerate every form of religion under certain conditions. But he hated and killed the Christian because the Christian was an enemy of the State in so far as his Christianity directly and openly subverted the State-religion. Marcus Aurelius venerated Christ at the same time that he slew His disciples—just for that reason. In classic ages no more serious charge could be urged

against a man than that of being contemptuous of the gods, i. *e.*, the State-religion. Say what you will of this, anyhow it proves that the classic pagans universally believed in the State being permeated by religion.

Of the Middle Ages in this connection nothing need be said, so thoroughly Catholic were its politics from imperial concerns down to those of a rural township.

So then it remained for the Modern man to do something absolutely new in history, namely, to create a godless State, to blandly put forth, as the initial axiom of political wisdom, this hopelessly false proposition, that "Religion should have nothing to do with politics." Now, in Ruskin's words, that is what I call denying Christ, denying God. For if religion should have nothing to do with politics, with those very questions which most vitally affect his temporal welfare and by consequence his whole being, then of what conceivable use is religion as a guide in this present existence? It is just as reasonable to push the statement to its logical result and say that religion should have nothing to do with a man's marriage, with divorce, with education, with children, with burial, with the "social evil," with anything—for is there anything which has not some connection direct or indirect with politics, *i. e.*, with human government?

It all goes to show how completely your real typical, consistent Modern has dissociated religion from practical life.

Nor is it pertinent to point in disproof to the various State-churches or to the personal religiousness of public functionaries. That disproves nothing. The bald fact remains that the State is more and more becoming absolutely uninfluenced by religion, that it is calmly ignoring religion in its various laws just as if religion did not exist. It goes on the tacit assumption that it, the State, is the first, last and only authority in human affairs. If religion's claims fit in with its laws, so much the better. If not so much the worse for religion. But, fit in or not fit in, the State is the ultimate source of all authority over mankind. And this, I repeat, is the most unique achievement of the modern mind. This is Modernism pure and unadulterated.

As Ruskin said, Modernism began and continues wherever mankind began and continues to deny Christ. For surely it is a denial of Christ, of God, of religion to ignore them all in the practical, daily concerns of life.

III. The Blight of Physical Science.

Every civilization naturally has its specialty because conditions force men to concentrate their thoughts upon one aspect of life more so than upon others. The Roman with his vast work of empire building thought upon law. The intensely speculative Greek was above all a philosopher in spite of being such a wonderful artist. The religious medievalist was preeminently a theologian, though also a profound metaphysician. The modern is a physical scientist.

But none of the three former were exclusively specialists. Attracted though they were by one subject of study, yet did they study all else and give all other studies their just attention, with the result that their own minds were wonderfully great, their culture broad and sane. But the modern is so slavishly immersed in physical science that he himself has become little, his culture all one-sided and arrogant, his power to think at times positively anaemic: he seems to have lost the power to reason clearly, to judge adequately the relation of all other things with science. How far this is true the reader can judge from the following.

The modern mind is, I say, little. Ours is an age of little men—brilliant men, keen men, but little. Just consider for a moment that modern times have not produced one single man of that real encyclopedic character so plentiful in classic and medieval times. Take a man, for instance, like Aristotle. Positively it makes one gasp to contemplate the almost superhuman power of his brain that covered every known department of knowledge from pure metaphysics down to pure physics; which could build up the vastest and most perfect system of philosophy the world has ever attained to; which grasped all

the known and in fact discovered so much of the physical science of his day: and then, with perfect ease, handle such apparently unrelated subjects as law, music, art and so on.

In the Middle Ages such encyclopedism is equally if not more abundant. Whatever dislike you may have for their theology or contempt for their science, yet you surely cannot but marvel at the sheer brain-power of men like Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, even Abelard, who seemed to have absorbed every single element of culture of their day. Or if you are suspicious because deliberately ignorant of their achievements, pick out at random one of those quatrocento universal minds for whom you probably have more affection. For instance, take Leonardo da Vinci. Now, allowing for the legendary exaggerations that have grown around him, yet sober history tells enough of his vast mentality to make it seem well-nigh incomprehensible. If ever the spiteful fairy god-mother passed by an infant, she surely passed by him and let the good fairies shower him with natural gifts. Not to mention his unusual strength and beauty of body, his mind was perhaps as varied as that of Aristotle. Here is a list of his mental qualifications. He was one of the greatest painters and sculptors of all times. Besides, he was distinguished as an architect, goldsmith, anatomist, botanist, physiologist, astronomer, geologist, chemist, geographer, geometrician, inventor and traveller. Nor is it an objection to pooh-pooh the inadequacy of his physical science compared to modern science. The point is that, however inferior that science comparatively was, yet such as it was his massive brain grasped it all as easily as it would now grasp it were he alive. Perhaps the very limitations of the science of his day made such a task all the harder.

So it went all along the line. Michael Angelo turns with ease from sonnets to military engineering. Raphael from his Madonnas to architecture. It seemed a very age of huge brains that took in everything and correlated every bit of knowledge. Now, I say, all that has disappeared. Modernism cannot point to a solitary genius comparable in vastness with these men. The eighteenth century encyclopedists were by comparison

mere scoffing dilettantes and our nineteenth century scientists, like Spencer and Darwin and Huxley, only brilliant specialists in one subject. Whatever credit moderns may claim—and they may justly claim much—for having extended the boundaries of knowledge, it is equally true that the human brain itself has lost power, has diminished in strength, in intensity; in a word, that the modern man is intellectually smaller than at any other period of civilization.

* * * * * * * * *

And not only smaller, but also has his brain become diseased, and this directly because of its hopeless slavery under the iron hand of physical science. To begin, we have lost intellectual humility, which surely ought to be one of the very fundamental virtues of a thinking man. Our scientific arrogance is as exasperating as it is unscientific. How true in this connection are the words of W. S. Lilly (*Right and Wrong,* p. x):

> "It is most astonishing, a most disheartening sign of the times, that people are supposed to be entitled to speak with authority upon questions of theology or ethics merely because they happened to have attained some degree of eminence in some branch of physical science."

Truly astonishing and disheartening. The very men who most fiercely resent intrusion into their laboratories by either philosopher or theologian, the very staunchest supporters of close investigation, men who demand incessantly that none dare pronounce an opinion in physical science unless thoroughly equipped in the same, who believe only what is scientifically proven by exactest methods—these are the very men who will solemnly pass conclusive opinions upon any other science, be it theology or law or metaphysics or ethics or sacred scripture, even though they have not given hardly cursory attention to it. By some strange perversion of the brain they have come to this astounding conclusion, that though none but a physical scientist is entitled to speak with authority upon physical science (wherein we agree), yet a physical scientist is entitled to speak upon all other sciences; that whilst it is unscientific for a theo-

logian to decline to swallow, without question, the newest and wildest and unproved evolutionary hypothesis, it is scientific for a physical scientist to reject off-hand, without examination, theological positions that have in them at least the venerability and reasonableness coming from centuries of trial; that rules of scientific investigation bind the theologian and philosopher at all times but the physical scientist only in his own restricted science; that it is scientific to reverentially bow at the magic name of Darwin, yet be ignorant of that of Aristotle; scientific to listen with bated breath to a description of some typhoid bacillus, yet fall asleep at a discussion of the immortality of the soul or the idea of space; that, in a word, physical science endows its votaries with a peculiar omniscience whereby it alone understands all things by intuition, and a sort of divine right to judge all things without hearing evidence. And so, because of this peculiar arrogance, the average man of science calmly assumes that his opinion is the last word on any subject from the infinite God to the most infinitesimal ion; and, strange to say, the average man accepts that opinion as such with an unthinking and unquestioning servility truly pathetic. Should you in the name of philosophy or theology or just plain common-sense venture an opposite opinion in the most courteous of terms, you are either rather rudely called narrow-minded and unprogressive by this supreme arbiter of thought or else blandly ignored as more or less of a nuisance.

And this is modern.[1] You seldom find such arrogance in the great classic or medieval thinkers. Aristotle and Plato are as tolerantly calm as their blue Attic skies. Thomas Aquinas, even when discussing a pagan or Jewish or Arabian error, proceeds with the magnificent serenity of truth itself. All of them willing and anxious to learn from sciences other than their own,

[1] For a classic specimen of modern impudence hear these words of Renan: "I am the one man of my century that has understood Jesus and St. Francis of Assisi." Such conceit is simply colossal. Try to imagine Thomas of Aquinas saying "I am the only man of my century that has understood Aristotle" and you will realize the fundamental difference in temper between a Medieval genius and a Modern savant.

placidly considerate of the lawful claims of every science to a patient hearing. No! It remained for the modern to be narrow-minded, to imagine that the possession of one bit of knowledge implied the possesion of all other knowledge or at least the right and capacity to pass judgment upon the same without even studying it.

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This scientific arrogance and exclusiveness are producing specifically disastrous effects upon other branches of mental training which are worthy of serious attention. First in theology. Now, strange as it may sound to the average modern, yet theology is, or rather ought to be, as scientific as physical science itself. Perhaps more so, because it deals with questions of far deeper import to the race, which, therefore, demand investigation far less influenced by passion, yet which are peculiarly susceptible to the influence of passion. However indifferent a few thinkers may be towards the supernatural, towards religion, there is no more universal and more persistent fact in the history of manknd than precisely this belief in a future world. It was old before any present scientific hypothesis was dreamed of. It started with the race. Moreover, no other fact has had such a tremendous influence upon human activity. A scientific theory like Aristotelian matter and form or Darwinian evolution have had their wide influence. But theirs is as passing zephyrs compared to the pentecostal rush of religion. Religion has colored every act of life, be it actual prayer and ceremonial or sculpture or labor or marriage or education—yea, death itself! Lastly there is no fact more intensely emotional, more liable to be vitiated, dergaded, made ridiculous or cruel by uncontrolled emotion. It reaches to every nerve, every impulse, every heart-string, and, therefore is peculiarly susceptible to every thrill of feeling of which man is capable—from love to hate, from virtue to vice, from beauty to hideousness.

This being the case, surely no fact ought to be approached with more scrupulous exactness of observation, with more ex-

pert training, with more patient investigation, with more precision of statement, with cooler head or purer heart or surer emotionalism. Really none should be approached with such downright absence of emotion, curious as this may sound. None should be expounded by such supremely rational criticism. In a word, it is the one subject which needs to be most scientific of all, in the sense that it should follow the lines of fundamental principles, confined strictly within the bounds of scientific methods. Other sciences may, without serious injury, at times be more or less eclectic and abnormal. But theology can never, without utter ruin, be aught than strictly scientific at all times.

Such was it in the days of such theological giants as Aquinas, Scotus, Peter Lombard and Bonaventure. You will, as a Protestant or otherwise, disagree with the faith of such men, even perhaps consider it superstitious. But surely, if you can forget this dislike, you must admire the marvelously strict scientific method of such thinkers. Just run over carelessly the *Summa* of Aquinas. Is it not from just a scientific point of view a marvel? From the tract on the existence of God to that on the Beatific Vision you see a great brain moving slowly, studying minutely every step, taking no conclusions except after the severest scrutiny of the premises, honestly facing every difficulty, putting every fact in its proper relation with all others, and withal in a style utterly free from passion, from temper, from prejudice, from aught that can disturb judgment. Was there ever a writing on any subject more strictly scientific both in method and style? And as a result you will also admit that that Catholic faith, in which you may disbelieve, is calm, serene, perfectly poised, entirely free from either reckless rationalism or ridiculous and disgusting fanaticism; that, whereas no religion blossoms out in fairer flowers of religious emotion, none more intense in its spiritual enthusiasm, none more exotic in its sheer spiritual beauty, nevertheless all this is serenely regulated within proper bounds by cool reason and firm authority.

But you moderns of other or no beliefs, how utterly and

thereby disastrously unscientific you are. Whilst demanding the strictest of scientific methods in physical science, you have utterly abandoned it in your religious inquiries. By a strange contradiction, the very men who exalt scientific methods in one science, calmly discard it in this: men who demand, and justly of course, that years of the most careful training should precede judgment upon a question of chemistry or biology, leave religion, which affects the most vital interests of even this life, to the untrained individual judgment of even any rattle-brained enthusiast who mistakes his misguided emotions for the very spirit of God and his fatuous thinking for supernatural revelation.

And what is the result? Religion has, as above said, become pretty generally a matter of indifference. Society flounders about helplessly in a perfect quagmire of opposing views upon vital questions like divorce, marriage, education. With those who do take religion seriously it becomes so often downright fanatic and ridiculous and mawkishly sentimental. Dowieism, Holy Rollers, Holy-Ghost-and-us, weird forms of religion stalk the land like so many Halloween monstrosities. Every numbskull theologian essays, with ludicrous solemnity and assurance, to solve any religious subject by the very simple touch-stone of his own personal feeling. Verily one doubts whether to laugh at the whimsicality of it all or to grieve over its tragedy or to turn away from such cattle in pure scientific disgust.

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Philosophy, above all logic, suffers no less than religion. Again turning back to the days of Aquinas and Aristotle, the present writer at least more and more regrets the passing of coherent thinking. Doubtless these men did insist overmuch upon logic. Doubtless it was faulty to try to reduce all human experience into the narrow limits of a syllogism, and certainly much valuable time and much brain-power were wasted by the later Scholastics in barren arguments over logic. But withal, these men at least thought clearly, coherently, logically, as all good "thinking" should of its very nature be. They

carefully defined their words before arguing about them. They stated their propositions with a cameo precision. They at least knew what they were talking about and so did their readers and hearers. As a result when they did approach other questions, be they politics or law or theology, they approached them with minds splendidly equipped as thinking machines.

Such coherence and clearness of thought have become a rare quality of the modern mind, whether educated or uneducated. So far as the former are in question, let me again quote Mr. W. S. Lilly (*Ib.*, p. 239):

> "Great gain would accrue if a little of the exact methods of the schools could be introduced into the arguments upon momentous subjects which from time to time find place in our leading Reviews. The rigorous definition, careful analysis, precise classification, would soon make an end of much loose thinking and looser writing."

Reviews have not changed since then. Their contributors attack every conceivable momentous problem and, as a class, with a looseness of thought, an almost sacrilegious carelessness in the use of terms and words, an anarchical contempt of logic known as mental order, a blind assumption of conclusions that have hardly a semblance of connection with their premises—a general looseness of thought and speech that often defies the analysis of the most careful reader. In fact, haziness, lack of clear-thinking are definitely recognized as proper mental attributes. *The Ladies Home Journal*, for instance, perhaps the most widely distributed magazine in America, has this delicious bit of wisdom in its issue of March 1st, 1911, (p. 28):

> "If you have a clean-cut, accurate notion of any one of these things," (*i. e.*, Life, God, Love, etc.) "you can be sure of one thing—you are wrong. If your idea is right, it is certain to be confused."

According to which, if the ladies reading this, their pet magazine, have a "clean-cut notion" that they "love" their husbands and children, then they can be sure they are wrong and that they do not love them. Or if my readers have a

"clean-cut notion" that God exists and is a personal being and created us all, then they can be sure they are mistaken. But if these ladies have only a "confused" idea that in some vague, uncertain fashion they may perhaps be in love, then they can be dead sure they are. And so on. You know you are wrong when you know you are right. Obscurity, haziness, doubt, vagueness are the only tests of certainty, the only attributes of truth.

Now, do not make the mistake of considering this looseness of thought and speech confined to the popular writers and readers. It is a quality also of the foremost men of science of the day. And in proof I merely ask you to read a most remarkable, but comparatively little known book by Samuel Wainwright, D. D., entitled *Scientific Sophisms: A Review of Current Theories concerning Atoms, Apes and Men* (Funk & Wagnalls, N. Y., 1883). With rare keenness it points out the absence of logic, of coherency joined to the reckless use of words and generally unscientific methods characterizing the utterances of such demi-gods in the world of science as Huxley and Tyndall. After reading its amazing revelations, I have often reflected that Christianity, and in particular Catholicity, would not stand for a year were they bolstered up by such a flimsy support as that upon which rests the so-generally accepted theory of Evolution. Just another instance of how "physical science" has the modern mind positively hypnotized to the point of accepting its weirdest dicta without question; of how the brain of the modern man has become enfeebled by its neglect of philosophy. No wonder that Mr. Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution* said that the modern mind is as inferior to the classic Athenian's as that of the negro is to the modern white man's.

Apropos of the above, note the following astounding confession of a modern philosopher:—

Professor William James in his *Pluralistic Universe* thus throws logic and common-sense to the winds: "For my part, I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely and irrevocably. * * * Reality, life, experience, con-

creteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it" (p. 22). Elsewhere he says:—"I saw that I must either forswear that 'psychology without a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian education has committed me,—I must in short bring back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, now singly and now in combination, in a word bring back scholasticism and common-sense—or else I must squarely confess the solution of the problem impossible, and then either give up my intellectual logic, the logic of identity, and adopt some higher (or lower) form of rationality, or finally, face the fact that life is logically irrational * * *. Those of us who are scholastic-minded, or simply common-sense minded, will smile at the elaborate groans of my parturient mountain resulting in nothing but this mouse" (p. 208).

IV. Heaviness of Spirit.

"Alas for this nineteenth century, by grace of its science-mongers called enlightened," said Francis Thompson. "With so much pleasure and so little joy; so much learning and so little wisdom; so much effort and so little fruition; so many philosophers and such little philosophy; so many seers and such little vision; so many prophets and such little foresight; so many teachers and such an infinite wild vortex of doubt; Poor, purblind, miserable century; let it cease to call itself 'enlightened,' and rather own itself, with all heaviness, in world-wide impenetrable darkness—the saddest of all recorded ages. The one divine thing left to us, in these latter days, is Sadness. Even our virtues take her stamp; the intimacy of our loves is born of despair; our very gentleness to our children is because we know how short their time. Eat, we say, eat, drink and be merry for to-morrow—ye are men" (*Moestitiæ Encomium*).

Say you: The judgment of a mere poet? A morphine ridden poet? Then listen to this from a critic, cold and glittering as an icicle—Walter Pater:

"The England in which melancholy and levity are becoming prevalent habits is Merry England no more. The nation Thou hast multiplied, but not increased the joy! And we are not the only nation which deserves this lamentation of the prophet. The growths of melancholy and levity have been still more marked in France. In America some traveller has remarked, 'There is comfort everywhere, but no joy' * * * Since about the beginning of this century how many of our geniuses have mingled their songs with tears and sighs; * * * while the scrannel pipes of the lower units have been playing to the sorry Yankee tune of 'There's nothing new, and there's nothing true, and it doesn't signify'" (*Cheerfulness in Life and Art*).

This terrible indictment of modern civilization is backed by the experience of those practical men of affairs best fitted by their very profession to observe—the physician and the priest. No; we do not need the prophetic warning of an inspired poet nor the chilly observation of an uninspired critic. There are too many witnesses in stone and wood and brick to this fearful spirit of heaviness. Sanitaria for wrecked nerves crown mountain tops and nestle in sweet vales, when in a healthier age they were capped by medieval castles or filled with meek convents for real men and women. Soul-tortured remnants of human hopes turn in despair to the ludicrous tenets of Christian Science for the one surcease of peace it does happen to have blundered upon. The very medical profession itself is more and more specializing in means to allay nervous agony with its psychotherapy and hypnotism and mental suggestion and even (the latest) interpretation of dreams.

And as for the priest, any one of them with some years of experience has observed how also even the priestly work is being directed not so exclusively as of yore to the very simple task of saving of souls from sin but, more and more to the more complex and delicate task of dispelling the gloom of their penitents. With Protestant ministers the new Emmanuel movement tells the same tale. Ever increasing is the number of those really good souls who, as they sigh, are "tired of life," who "see nothing in life," who feel "depressed" for no particular reason than just sheer ennui and disgust of life. Thompson is right: this is the "saddest of all recorded ages."

Among the many causes for this social condition, let us note one in particular. And that cause I unhesitatingly name physical science. It is mentioned so specially for two reasons. First, because the fetish-worshippers of modern science persistently praise science for having done so much towards alleviating human suffering by conquering diseases like smallpox, diphtheria, and so forth, which formerly claimed its yearly thousands, and by its inventions having so vastly increased the comforts of life. Secondly, because, if you give time to reflect upon all the various other causes for this age-depression, somehow you will find that physical science seems to create that peculiar swampy atmosphere in which this malady of the soul is born and thrives most tropically.

For instance. Science today is on the whole utterly indifferent to the supernatural, say what apologists will of its alliance with faith in former ages. It does not deny the supernatural or faith with the frank and really more respectable atheism of the eighteenth century encyclopedists. But, as above said, it accomplishes a more deadly because insidious atheism by calmly ignoring the supernatural. So that whilst humanity at present professes as much as ever some forms of religion, nevertheless, religion has gone out of its practical thinking as never before in the world's history. And because of this, then right here it is easy to see why the race is so heavy in spirit. For, surely, what gives life substantial joy in the very teeth of its miseries, before the open door of death itself, but just this hope of a future life. The fear of God is more than the beginning of wisdom; it is the beginning of interior joy, which a foolish agnosticism can never impart with all its science.

It will be urged on behalf of science that it, particularly the medical, has so wonderfully alleviated bodily pain. True enough. But it is equally true that these very bodily comforts are diminishing our capacity to stand pain. We are rapidly losing that splendid discipline of pain under which a less pampered generation grew strong of soul. Our very piety reflects this horror of pain. Even we Catholics turn more to

the Sacred Heart than to the Crucifix, which was *the* great devotion of those rugged but buoyant Middle Ages. So, when pain does come, in spite of all our medicine, we flee like cowards to the drug or the anaesthetic, and in the long run are less happy than those who faced pain like men and never flinched. Science with its coddling of the human body has made the soul soft and cowardly and thereby decreased its capacity to suffer. No wonder dear ladies will weep over the suffering of a pet dog, who in a ruder age would fearlessly die themselves for a principle. No wonder the Middle Ages had no sanitaria for wrecked nerves.

And, now, a last charge in this matter against physical science, namely, it is withering in man that one faculty which, next to a supernatural faith, contributes most to his enjoyment of life—imagination. Just consider for a moment how much happiness we get through our imagination, which I would define (with all due deference to philosophers) as just the plain ability to see the beautiful in things and behind things. A mother's love of the infant at her breast, a lover's seeking of his beloved, a patriot's dying for his country, a student's wasting of life for his science—all that is ever noble and best in life is inspired and driven by imagination, by this seeking for something all the more beautiful because so spiritually intangible. Without it a man becomes a dull-witted and a sad dog at best.

And I say we are fast losing this faculty. The average man on the street, good man though he be, is about as prosaic a human as the world ever saw. He is as matter of fact as his hard streets and as monotonously same. There is a strange lack of resiliency in his spiritual make-up, an undefinable grossness in his thinking, a wearying banality in his speech, a hollowness or lack of boisterous health in his laugh, a mawkish lack of art in their sorrow. He is not only the saddest of men, as Thompson said, but the dullest, the most uninteresting.

Science has made him so indirectly and in some curious ways. Its very inventions have destroyed his sense of wonder. "There's nothing new." The steam engine, air-ship, submar-

ine, wireless telegraph, ocean cable, have done a deadly work of withering up all sense of wonder. "You have no fairies in America," I once heard Seumas McManus say regretfully. Too true! We have no longer any fairies. We have lost the spiritual sight, the sixth sense of wonder, which enables man to see the spiritual beauty beyond the physical eye. We cannot be surprised at anything: the joy of surprise, of hope, of anticipation, has gone from our hearts. The very children mock at poor Santa Claus like the children who stoned the prophet of old.

Travel itself, made possible so largely by science, contributes its share in this dulling process. The world has shrunk almost to the size of a city back-yard. Peary in discovering the North Pole gave the *coup-de grâce* to that delicious wonder we once found in Robinson Crusoe and Treasure Island. "There's nothing new" any more. They say the Sea of Saragossa yet defies the explorer. If so, thank God! there's one spot on the earth's face man has not seen; it leaves something for the imagination.

And as for the children, verily, it is another slaughter of the Innocents by this modern Herod called science. Hans Andersen and Grimm and Santa Claus, with their brave princes and fair princesses and fierce dragons and fairies and witches and Christmas imagery, are fast fleeing. The poor children instead must be taught "facts"—a hodge-podge of public school science. In consequence what an unimaginative lot they are becoming; so mature beyond their age, so sophisticated, so lacking in real child sweetness! Their very mirth is so often downright vapid. Take in instance those awful comic supplements to the Sunday papers with the monotonous idiocy of Jeff and Mutt and Foxy Grandpa and Desperate Desmond. Verily, the future archaeologist will put us down as a race of lunatics, unless the book-worn and time mercifully first destroy these proofs of our want of real humor and imagination. And lastly, is it not a peculiarly depressing commentary upon our senseless withering of the child's imagination when the schools actually employ men and women to *teach the*

children games! Good God! Where is the poor child's innate fantasy gone that he *needs* to be taught how to play, that he cannot invent games of his own. Yes; it is gone along with the fairies and dragons and Santa Claus and the numberless other creatures of the imagination which so prettily lifted up the veil of sense hiding the spiritual beauty lying behind. Verily, I think Wordsworth must have had such thought when he wrote in disgust at the banality of modern life:

> "Great God! I'd rather be
> A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
> So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
> Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn,
> Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
> Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

V. The Lost Art of Humility.

A final word to that type of critic who dismisses all severe criticism as just mere pessimism. Now, none more than the present writer enjoys a keener appreciation of the good in modern civilization or in its chief exponent, physical science. Such simplicities of argument should be dismissed by all serious men as understood formalities. Similarly it can with equal security also be presumed that even a harsh criticism of the faults of an age may after all be the most sympathetic. So much for that.

So then let us conclude with these two comments. First, as to physical science. And on this point are quoted, as sufficiently expressing the attitude of the preceding pages, the words of Sir Oliver Lodge. This eminent observer said that:

> "Science is one thing and philosophy another * * * . Science most properly concerns itself with matter and motion, and reduces phenomena, so far as it can, to mechanism. The more successfully it does that, the more it fulfills its end and aim, but when, on the strength of that achievement, it seeks to blossom into a philosophy, when it endeavors to conclude that its scope is complete and all-inclusive, that nothing exists in the universe but mechanism, and that the aspect of things from this scientific aspect is their only aspect,—then it is becoming narrow and bigoted and deserving of rebuke."

Carlyle stigmatized such philosophy as a gospel of dirt. Ruskin contemptuously put it aside. Tennyson seemed at times almost overwhelmed by it and cried out in agony.

With this as a sort of preamble, we come to the second and final comment. Now I would say that this spirit of evil afflicting modern society will not be got rid of very successfully until we cease our slavish adoration of a certain scientific philosophy generally called evolution, which (as a philosophy) popularly amounts to considering ourselves the most perfect because latest expression of human genius. Candidly, I have my suspicions of evolution, at least as applied to historical man, whatever may be said of it as applied to his more or less mythical descent from the anthropoidal or any other ape. Somehow or other—maybe just out of a sense of humor—I cannot shake off the conviction that a dog was always a dog and a cat always a cat, and that said dog to-day takes no more pleasure in chasing the cats in my yard in 1912 than he did in worrying cats by the banks of the Nile in the Pharoah's days, deliciously irreverent of pussy's divine attributes in the minds of her Egyptian adorers. Similarly I have a most unscientific sneaking suspicion that the modern American is not very far above the so-called cave-man, that his vaunted civilization may be after all not far beneath his skin. Voltaire, by the way, found this out in the case of the eighteenth century Frenchman. He scratched him, and lo! the cave-man appeared in Marat. All of which is just another way of saying, what I have all along been saying, that it is high time for thinking men to refuse to bow down before this modern god of evolution, whose practical creed is that an age is better than a preceding age simply because it comes after. I hold it legitimate criticism to say that a succeeding age can be in many respects distinctly inferior to a preceding.

And I do maintain that this age of ours is, with all its prestige, in many respects a retrogression instead of an evolution in human existence. Granted cheerfully that it has more actual knowledge, more physical comfort, perhaps (though this is doubtful) more gentleness of manner. But there the superiority would seem to end.

For instance. For sake of argument, admit that the cave-man did often steal his wife in between dodging weird-looking prehistoric beasts with such fearfully scientific names. Well! Anyhow, he probably kept her and she bore his many brawny children. Your modern man also often steals his wife; but she is some one else's wife, and he and she shrink from a child's laugh as shamelessly as Onan of old. Between the two men, I choose the cave-man, because his dirt was dirt of earth, but the other's dirt is dirt of soul. As a question of mere moral development, I fail to see the superiority of Reno, Nevada, to a cave.

Then, too, for just sheer spiritual or (lest the term be unfamiliar) emotional development has your science-ridden modern aught to compare with the sublime faith of Abraham, the splendid humanity of David or the gorgeous prophesy of Isaias or the divinely measured wisdom of Solomon? With our shallow thinking and mawkish sentimentality can we not envy the classic Greek who created out of nothing the *Iliad* of Homer, the tragedies of Euripides, the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the Parthenon and Venus de Milo? And our law, with its jungle of technicalities that cover up so well the modern criminal, what a travesty upon justice is it compared with that swift, sure, serene Roman law that made the "Pax Romana" from Britain to Persia!

Lastly, the despised, slandered Middle Ages! I do maintain that we today are man for man inferior in more ways than we are superior. We do not think as clearly as Thomas Aquinas nor build as well as Michael Angelo, nor paint as well as Raphael, nor write as good poetry as Dante, nor solve labor problems successfully and do as fine craft work as the Gildsmen; our nerves are not as well strung as those of Richard Plantagenet, our heart not as light as a Troubadour's, our military courage not as sustained as that of the Crusading Godfrey, our humanity not as catholic as that of Francis of Assisi; we are not as distinctly individual and self-contained as the average highly finished medieval; nor have we his sane, encyclopedic, well-balanced outlook upon life; we have not his

marvellous creative force that hewed a new civilization out of chaos; his serenely magnificent faith, together with its accompanying emotionalism in hymn and ceremonial, is replaced by our doubt and almost absurdly pathetic attempt at mysticism, for who, unless a hopeless victim of his prejudices, would compare a modern half-baked Christian with a Bernard, a Maeterlinck and Rostand with a Thomas à Kempis or Tauler or Francis of Assisi? We have lost even the art of sinning, for our sins are of the skulking kind, shadings off from our virtues and very largely making use of the mask of piety, a cowardly, sneaking, "eminently respectable" way of sinning, compared to which a robber-baron cutting a Jew-peddler's throat by the Rhine or Loire seems positively artistic, and Colonna beating a Pope almost to death at Anagni appears Satanic in his sin—Why?—because, those men in their very sin paid tribute to God by defying Him brazenly, and did not, like your modern Sunday-school superintendent or affinity-seeker or half-naked opera-box holder, skulk around in the clothing of piety and love and art. And so on. The list grows indefinitely of modern shallowness of thought, rottening of emotion, until a plain man knows not whether to lash it all like the prophet interpreting the writing on the wall or, like that superbly devilish Voltaire, wish that he had twenty more years of life wherein to see all this pretense collapse—as it did collapse—and as this will.

Therefore, let us, once and for all, cease our uncritical, undiscriminating prattle about "modern progress" and the "dark ages" and "gradual evolution of the race" and "modern enlightenment"—shibboleths on the lips of every smug professor and yellow journalist. Let us shake off the hypnotic spell of a tyrannical physical-science and tell it boldly that, while we admire it and are grateful to it and unreservedly accept its facts *as science*, yet, that it is impertinent and silly and out of its sphere when it presumes to become a philosophy and to make itself the supreme and sole judge of truth. Let us, while being in full sympathy with all the genuine worth in our age, nevertheless keep our heads clear enough and our

hearts pure enough to see the false in it. Surely this is not pessimism, but merely rational criticism. And, if a bit rude in style, let me say finally that some such brusque language would seem to be needed if we would succeed in waking up the modern sentimentalists from their day-dreaming in their fools' paradise.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

WHY PRIVATE LANDOWNERSHIP IS A NATURAL RIGHT.

A natural right is a right derived from the nature of the human individual, and existing for his welfare. Hence it differs from a civil right, which has its source in society or the State, and is intended to fulfil a social or civil purpose. Such, for example, is the right to vote, or the right to hold a civil office. Since a natural right is neither derived from nor primarily intended for a civil end, it cannot be destroyed, and it may not be ignored, by the State. For instance, the right to life and the right to liberty are so sacred to the individual, so necessary to his welfare, that the State cannot rightfully kill an innocent man, nor punish him by a term in prison.

While all natural rights are equally valid, they differ as to their basis and urgency. From this point of view, we may profitably distinguish three principal types.

The first is exemplified in the right to live. Life, the object of this right, is intrinsically good, good for its own sake, an end in itself. It is the end to which even civil society is a means. Since life is good intrinsically, the right to life is also valid intrinsically, and not because of consequences. Since there is no conceivable equivalent for life in the case of any individual in any contingency, the right to life is immediate and direct in all possible circumstances.

Among the natural rights of the second class, the most prominent are the right to marry, to enjoy personal freedom, and to own consumption-goods, such as food and clothing. The objects of these rights are not ends in themselves, but means to human welfare. Confining our attention to marriage, we see that membership in the conjugal union is an indispensable means to reasonable life and self-development in the majority of persons. The only conceivable substitutes are free love and celibacy. Of these the first is inadequate for any person, and the second is adequate only for a minority. Marriage is,

therefore, *directly* and *per se* necessary for the majority of individuals; for the majority it is an *individual* necessity. If the State were to abolish marriage it would deprive the majority of an indispensable means of right and reasonable life. Consequently the majority have a *direct* natural right to the legal power of marrying.

In the case of the minority who do not need to marry, who can live as well or better as celibates, the legal opportunity of marriage is evidently not directly necessary. But it is necessary indirectly, inasmuch as the *power of choice* between marriage and celibacy is an individual necessity. No argument is required to show that the State could not decide this matter consistently with individual welfare or social peace. Whence it follows that even the minority who do not wish or do not need to marry, have a natural right to embrace or reject the conjugal condition. For them the right is indirect, but none the less inviolable. (The marriage-rights of criminals, degenerates, and other socially dangerous persons, are passed over here as not pertinent to the present discussion. For the same reason no use is made of the perfectly valid social argument for the individual right of marriage.)

The right of private landownership belongs in a third class of natural rights. Inasmuch as ownership of land is not an intrinsic good, but merely a means to human welfare, it differs from life, and resembles marriage. On the other hand, it is essentially unlike marriage because it is not *per se* and *directly* necessary for the majority nor for any one individual.[1] The alternative to marriage, namely, celibacy, would not under the most perfect social administration enable the majority to lead right and reasonable lives. The alternative to private ownership, namely, complete or partial Socialism, if efficiently administered would attain all the vital ends of private ownership. At least, this result has been attained in many pastoral societies, and conceivably it may be repeated in other social conditions than those now existing. Food, clothing, shelter, secu-

[1] Cf. Vermeersch, *Quaestiones de Justitia*, no. 204.

rity of livelihood and of residence, and all the other vital goods to which private landownership is a means, could be obtained through the managerial use of productive land by the individual, or even through a system of wages and insurance, together with long-term leases of the land used for residence sites. Even now something of this kind happens in the case of many persons who work upon or live upon land owned by the State. Such persons are not by nature exceptions. Any other person could be adequately provided for in the same way. Comparing the nature and needs of the individual with the nature and capacities of State ownership we see that the latter are *per se* sufficient in any and every case. No individual, neither Brown, nor Jones, nor Smith; no group of individuals, neither Germans, nor Irish, nor French, exists for whom this system of land tenure is essentially insufficient.

In our present industrial civilization, however, private land ownership is *indirectly* necessary for the welfare of the individual. It is said to be *indirectly* necessary because it is necessary as a social institution, rather than as something immediately connected with individual needs as such. It is not indeed, so necessary that society would promptly go to pieces under any other form of land tenure. It is necessary in the sense that it is capable of promoting the welfare of the average person, of the majority of persons, to a much greater degree than State ownership. It is necessary for the same reason and in the same way as a civil police force. As the State is obliged to maintain a police force, so it is obliged to maintain a system of private landownership. As the citizen has a right to police protection, so he has a right to the social and economic advantages which are connected with the system of private ownership of land. These rights are natural, derived from the needs of the individual in society, not dependent upon the good pleasure of the city or the State. They are individual rights to the existence and benefits of these social institutions.

But man's rights in the matter of land tenure are more extensive than his rights with regard to a police force. They are not restricted to the presence and functioning of a social

institution. Every citizen has a natural right to police protection, but no citizen has a natural right to become a policeman. The welfare of the citizen is sufficiently looked after when the members of the police are selected by the authorities of the city. On the contrary, his welfare would not be adequately safeguarded if the State were to decide who might and who might not become landowners. In the first place, the normal condition is that in which *all* persons can easily become actual owners. In the second place, the mere legal opportunity of becoming owners is a considerable stimulus to the energy and ambition of all persons, even of those who are never able to convert it into an economic opportunity. Therefore, only a very powerful reason of social utility would justify the State in excluding any person or any class from the legal power to own land. No such reason exists; and there are many reasons why the State should not attempt anything of the sort. As a consequence of these facts, every person, whether an actual owner or not, has a natural right to acquire property in land. This right is evidently a necessary condition of a fair and efficient system of private ownership, which is in turn a necessary condition of individual welfare. The right of private landownership is, therefore, an indirect right; but it is quite as valid and quite as certain as any other natural right.

Now this right is certainly valid as against complete Socialism which includes State management and use, as well as State ownership. Is it valid against the Single Tax system, or against such modified forms of Socialism as would allow the individual to rent and use the land as an independent cultivator with security of tenure? Would the introduction of some such scheme in a country in which only a small minority of the population were actual owners, constitute a violation of individual rights? While we cannot with any feeling of certainty return an affirmative answer to these questions, we can confidently affirm that reform within the lines of private ownership would in the long run be more effective, and, therefore, that the right of private ownership is *probably* valid even against these modified forms of common ownership.

The indirect character of the right of private landownership, its relativity to and dependence upon social conditions, is not always sufficiently grasped by either its advocates or its opponents. In the writings of the former we sometimes find language which suggests that this right is as independent of social conditions as the right to marriage or the right to life. "The State has no right to abolish private property [in land] because private property is not a social right, but an individual right derived from nature, not derived from the State." It exists for *human* welfare, not merely for *civil* welfare.[2] The only defect in this reasoning is that the premises do not justify the conclusion. Undoubtedly the State may not abolish private ownership, *so long as it is necessary for human or individual welfare;* but, when this necessity ceases, the moral justification of the institution likewise disappears. The institution may then be abolished, somehow, by some agency, without any violation of individual rights. Why may not the task of abolition be performed by the State? No other agency is available. The assertion that the State is incompetent to decide whether the institution of private ownership has outlived its usefulness, is entirely gratuitous; besides, it implies that a small minority of selfishly interested persons may justly require the continuation of a system of land tenure which has become harmful to the overwhelming majority of the community. Extreme defenses of the right of private landownership are largely responsible for the misconceptions of many of its opponents. Occasionally the latter represent this right as an *a priori* monstrosity which is serenely independent of the facts of life and industry. While such persons are at liberty to reject the interpretations of facts contained in the preceding paragraphs, they cannot reasonably deny the logic of the process which has led to the conclusion that the individual has a natural right to own land.

So much for the natural right of landownership as seen in the light of reason. Let us now consider it briefly from the

[2] Liberatore, *Principles of Political Economy*, pp. 134, 130.

side of doctrinal authority, namely, the writings of the Fathers and Theologians of the Church, and the formal pronouncements of the Popes.

Some of the Church Fathers, particularly Augustine, Ambrose, Basil, Chrysostom, and Jerome, denounce riches and the rich so severely that they have been accused of denying the right of private ownership. The facts, however, are that none of the passages upon which this accusation is based proves it to be true, and that in numerous other passages all of these writers explicitly affirm that private ownership is lawful.[3] Speaking generally, we may say that they taught the moral goodness of private ownership without insisting upon its necessity. Hence they cannot be cited as authorities for the doctrine that the individual has a natural right to own land.

Some of the great theologians of medieval and post-medieval times denied this right, inasmuch as they denied that the institution of private ownership was imposed or commanded by the natural law. Among them are Scotus,[4] Molina,[5] Lessius,[6] Suarez,[7] Vasquez,[8] and Billuart.[9] Since private landownership is not absolutely necessary to human welfare in all forms of society, it cannot, in their view, be regarded as strictly prescribed by the natural law, nor be instituted without the positive action of civil authority, or the consent of the community. Nevertheless they all admit that it is much better than common ownership in contemporary societies. The difference between their position and that of De Lugo, for example, seems to be two-fold; First, they put stronger emphasis upon the doctrines that the earth belongs to all men in common, that in

[3] Cf. Vermeersch, *op. cit.*, no. 210; Ryan, *The International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1903.

[4] *In IV. Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, n. 5; and *Reportata parisiensia*, d. 15, q. 4, n. 7-12.

[5] *De Justitia et Jure*, tr. 2, d. 18 and 20.

[6] *De Justitia et Jure*, c. 5, n. 3.

[7] *De Legibus*, l. 2, c. 14, n. 13 and 16.

[8] In *Summa*, 1ma 2ae, d. 157, n. 17.

[9] *De Justitia et Jure*, d. 4, a. 1.

the absence of original sin ownership would likewise have been common, and that this arrangement is therefore in a fundamental sense, normal, agreeing with nature and the natural law; and, second, they put a lower estimate upon the superiority of private ownership even in contemporary conditions. In a word, they denied that private ownership was so much better than any alternative system as to confer upon the individual a natural right in the strict sense; that is, a right which laid upon the State the correlative obligation of maintaining the institution of private landownership.

On the other hand, many of the ablest theologians of the same period declared that private ownership was enjoined by the natural law and right reason, and consequently that it was among the individual's natural rights. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, private property is "necessary for human life," and is one of those social institutions which are prescribed by the *jus gentium;* and the content of the *jus gentium* is not determined by positive law, but by the dictates of "natural reason," by "natural reason itself." [10] These statements seem to convey the doctrine of natural right as clearly as could be expected in the absence of an explicit declaration. Cardinal De Lugo sets forth the same teaching somewhat more compactly, but in substantially the same terms: "Speaking generally, a division of goods and of ownership-titles proceeds from the law of nature, for natural reason dictates such division as necessary in the present circumstances of fallen nature and dense populations." [11] This view is to-day universally accepted among Catholic writers.

The official teaching of the Church on the subject is found in the Encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor," by Pope Leo XIII. In this document we are told that the proposals of the Socialists are "manifestly against justice"; that the right of private property in land is "granted to man by nature"; that it is derived "from nature not from man, and the State has

[10] *Summa Theologica*, 2a 2ae, q. 57, a. 2 and 3.
[11] *De Justitia et Jure*, d. 6, s. 1, n. 6.

the right to control its use in the interest of the public good alone, but by no means to abolish it altogether." These statements the Pope deduces from a consideration of man's needs. Private property in land is necessary to satisfy the wants, present and future, of the individual and his family. Were the State to attempt the task of making this provision, it would exceed its proper sphere, and produce manifold domestic and social confusion.

While Pope Leo defines the natural right of private ownership as incompatible with complete Socialism, that is, collective use as well as collective ownership, his statements cannot fairly or certainly be interpreted as condemning the Single Tax system, or any other arrangement which would leave to the individual managerial use and secure possession of his holding, together with the power to transmit and transfer it, and full ownership of improvements. These are the only elements of ownership which the Holy Father defends, and which he insists upon as necessary. The one element of private ownership which the Single Tax System would exclude, namely, the power to take rent from and profit by the changes in land values, finds no place among the advantages of private ownership enumerated in the Encyclical.

There is, indeed, one passage in which Pope Leo seems to allude to the Single Tax or to some similar scheme. He rejects the views of those who would "grant to the individual man the use of the soil, and the various products of landed possessions, but who declare it absolutely wrong that one should consider himself the real owner of the land upon which he has built, or of the estate that he has brought under cultivation." Such persons, he declares, "are robbing a man of the very fruits of his labor"; that is, the labor that he has expended in improving the land. Now, the first of these statements is not against the Single Tax system as such, but against the assertion of Henry George that private ownership is essentially unjust. It condemns one of the arguments for the system, not the system itself. It could be accepted by any Single Taxer who rejects this particular argument, or by any other who desires to see

the Single Tax system established, but who does not admit that the present system is morally wrong. As to the second statement quoted above, it does not apply to the proposals of the Single Tax advocates; for they would concede to the individual holder the full ownership and benefit of improvements. Nor is there anything in the principles of the system to deprive the individual of full protection against confiscation in any case in which improvement values could not be exactly distinguished from land values.

It is true that Henry George wrote his "Open Letter to Pope Leo XIII," with a view of refuting the doctrines of the Encyclical. But all his arguments are directed against the principle that private landownership is right and just. Apparently Henry George did not find that Pope Leo condemned any essential element of the Single Tax itself, considered merely as a system of land tenure. Apparently the head and front of the Holy Father's offending was his ethical defense of the present system.

To put the sum of this article in two sentences: Private landownership is a natural right because in present conditions the institution is necessary for individual and social welfare. The right is certainly valid against complete Socialism, and probably valid against any such radical modification of the present system as that contemplated by the thorough-going Single Tax advocates.

JOHN A. RYAN.

GERBERT, POPE SYLVESTER II.

What John the Scot was in the ninth century, Gerbert, Pope Sylvester II, was in the tenth—a great light shining in a world of comparative darkness and ignorance. John the Scot is a mysterious personality, because so little is known with certainty about the beginning and the close of his career; Gerbert's biography is perplexing because with much that is historically certain there is intermingled still more that is legendary, with the facts that are simple and intelligible is interwoven a mass of fables that are weird and bewildering. Gerbert as we know him from history, the student, the teacher, the mathematician, the philosopher, the prelate, the pope, and Gerbert as he was known to some of his imaginative contemporaries and to his enemies of a later time, the magician, the sorcerer, the dealer in uncanny contracts with the evil one, seem to be two entirely different personalities. It will be our task to try and unravel the mesh of fact and fancy, to extricate history from fable, and to place the true personality of the man in contrast with the false creation of minds that were misled partly by hatred of the papacy and partly by uncontrolled love of the marvellous.

The tenth century was a chaotic age. Politically, France was passing through the series of disturbances which resulted in 987 by the crowning of Hugh Capet as King,—it was the end of the Carolingians and the beginning of Capetian line. In Germany, there was similar confusion, which resulted in the substitution of the Saxon line for the Carolingian, out of which came, at the end of the century the comparatively prosperous reigns of the first three Ottos. Italy, North and South, was in a condition bordering on anarchy, and in central Italy, and especially in Rome, the usurpations of the Counts of Tusculum, led to a series of aggressions which plunged the papacy itself into one of the severest trials in all the history of that institution. There was factionism everywhere, and a

spirit of pagan worldliness against which spiritually-minded prelates like Ratherius of Verona protested with indignation. Ecclesiastical and monastic discipline were disturbed by the confusion of political conditions, and synods like that of Coblenz in 922 and Erfurt in 932, made strenuous efforts to restore the ancient order and the regularity of ecclesiastical life. The reign of ignorance and superstitition was very widespread. Men like Brother Bruno of Cologne, Bishop Ulric of Augsburg, Blessed Wolfgang of Regensburg, and other noted ecclesiastics strove for the restoration of learning in the cloister and cathedral schools, but were often unsuccessful owing to fresh invasions of the restless Huns who pillaged and burned their way through Germanic provinces, and seemed especially bent on destroying art and literature as well as religious and political institutions. There was a general, though by no means a universal, belief that the end of the world was at hand, that the year one thousand was the limit set for the reign of Christianity. And where there was already little room for learned leisure and no encouragement for cultivating the arts of peace, the belief in the approaching end of all things was readily adopted as an excuse for the suspension of all literary labor. It reacted too on morals in what seems to us a curious manner. For, instead of turning men's minds to the practices of piety, the fear of a world catastrophe acted like a panic, and brought out the worst elements in human character. It would be easy, of course, to overdraw the picture. Reformers, like Ratherius of Verona, are not to be taken literally in all their invectives against the prevailing conditions. Like him who, in his attempt to purify the stream, often stirs up the mud and sediment and makes matters worse, temporarily at least, so the prelates who exerted themselves in favor of a stricter moral life among clergy and laity bring to the surface in their writings the very worst abuses of the time, and their testimony must be offset by other narratives if we are to form a just estimate of the age which they were trying to reform. Nevertheless, we are forced to admit that the age was one of unusual darkness in matters intellectual and of exceptional confusion in matters of

morals. If only we do not generalize too freely, we may with many Catholic historians, describe the tenth century as the darkest age, the *leaden age,* as Cardinal Baronius calls it.

In all the darkness and confusion of the age, and in spite of the sad succession of unworthy popes, it was to the papacy and to Rome that the world looked as to its only hope, as to the only possible source of reform and amelioration. Out of the gloom of the tenth century comes a collection of curious little books written for the guidance of pilgrims to the catacombs and the shrines of the apostles. These interesting treatises, often passed over by historians who see only the darker side, are full of spiritual idealism, of an idealism which we must analyze here, if we are to understand the rôle that Gerbert played in the work of reform. The idealism is partly religious and partly political. It is aroused not only by the sight of the scenes of early Christian heroism, the catacombs and the Colosseum, the shrines of the Apostles and the tombs of the martyrs, but also by the sight of the stately monuments of pagan antiquity, the relics of the political past, which now loomed up as a golden age of worldly grandeur and civil supremacy. Calmness and dignity was what the age needed most, the calmness of religious piety and the dignity of Roman legal institutions. Rome symbolized both, and when, through the patronage of the Emperor Otto III, Gerbert the monk and scholar found the road open to the highest dignity of the Church, the Empire and the papacy seemed to be restored to ancient peace and to pristine splendor. The prestige of Otto as Emperor put an end to local factionism for the time, and the fame of Gerbert as a man of learning promised better times for the See of Peter and the condition of the Church in every land. The interference of the first three Ottos in the affairs of the Church was not in itself a desirable thing, nor is it in agreement with the spirit of ecclesiastical law. Nevertheless the actual event to which we refer put an end to a condition that was intolerable, and may be judged to have been a benefit. Under Gerbert as Pope Sylvester II, the See of Peter resumed its authority in the affairs of the Church all over Europe, and, according to

some historians, took the first step towards dealing with the great problem of the Orient, the check of Saracen aggression and the Mahometan advance on Christendom.

These general conditions in the tenth century needed to be described before taking up the study of Gerbert as a philosopher. Once more, however, the caution should be repeated that the age was not entirely dark nor was there complete and absolute dearth of letters and education. In some of the monasteries, especially in Germany and Switzerland, there was considerable activity. The *Annals* of Hildesheim and St. Gall, the *History of Saxony* written by Widukind, a monk of Corvey, the Latin poems of the learned nun Hroswitha of Gandersheim, and the German poems in praise of the Ottos, all date from the tenth century. In order to appreciate the preëminence of Gerbert as a scholar it is sufficient to draw the picture of his times as they really were; it is not necessary to exaggerate nor to deny to others the credit that is due them.

Gerbert was a Burgundian by birth. He was born at Aurillac, or near Aurillac, between the years 940 and 945. Whatever success he had in life he owed to his ability and his talents; he certainly did not owe it to birth or family influence. His parents were poor and probably peasants. He was educated at the Benedictine monastery of Aurillac, and there he joined that great historic order which had already distinguished itself as a factor in European civilization. At Aurillac he studied grammar and rhetoric under a teacher named Raymond, for whom, all during his later career, he retained the warmest and most cordial affection. Had Gerbert remained at the monastery of Aurillac he might in turn have become the master of a school there, but his talents would have been hidden, and it would have been impossible for him to play the important part he actually did play in the history of the Church and of the world. Fortunately, while he was still a student, there came to the monastery Count Borel of Barcelona, who ruled a considerable part of the Spanish Marches. With him Gerbert journeyed to Barcelona, which had been recovered from the Moors about a century earlier, and where, even in the ninth

century, there was to be had an education in mathematics more thorough than anywhere else in Europe.

At this point begins the legend of Gerbert. He went, we are told, to Cordova and there attached himself to the household of a Saracen philosopher, who possessed all the secrets of natural science and of magic. The Christian pupil was so eager and so apt that in a short time he acquired all the knowledge in the possession of his Mussulman teacher,—all except the contents of a certain book on magic which the ancient sage preserved with the most jealous care. Gerbert sought by service and by presents to win access to this precious volume, but in vain. Then the element of Romance comes in. He made love to the daughter of the philosopher. She administered a sleeping draught to the venerable teacher and stole the book from under his pillow. With the much-prized volume in his hands, the pupil hastened from the city, bent on escaping to Christian lands; but he was closely pursued by the enraged master, who somehow discovered the loss. Gerbert, always a diligent student, literally read as he ran, and so discovered a trick which saved his life. For it was written in the book of magic that anyone reciting a certain formula might render himself invisible so long as he touched neither earth nor water. The formula was soon learned, and put to immediate use. All the fugitive had to do was to hurry to the next bridge, swing over the railing, cling to a beam, recite his formula and become invisible, hanging between earth and water. Unfortunately the picturesque story will have to be relegated to the department of fiction. We have good reason to believe that Gerbert never visited Moorish Spain, never had a Saracen teacher, and owes whatever learning he acquired to the Christian teachers of Barcelona and Vich.

After three years spent at Barcelona Gerbert went to Rome in the company of Count Borel and the Bishop of Vich. There he was introduced to Otto I who, three years before, had been crowned Emperor. He made a favorable impression on the young prince, who thenceforth took a lively personal in-

terest in his career. Given his choice of various ecclesiastical offices, he preferred to go to the cathedral school of Rheims "in order to study logic." To Rheims, therefore, he went, and there he spent the happiest years of his life. Gerbert had a talent for friendship, and at Rheims he found in the person of Adalbero, the Archbishop of that See, a man on whom he could lavish all his affection and devotion. "We were one heart and one mind," he writes, when, in 989, death deprived him of his patron and friend. For ten years Gerbert as head of the school at Rheims led a life of ideal peace in spite of the disorder that reigned in the political and ecclesiastical world around him. He was wonderfully successful as a teacher. He had a talent for clearness, and spared no pains to facilitate the task of his pupils. In his lectures on rhetoric and argumentation he used diagrams to illustrate the text. In mathematics he employed the Abacus, a mechanical contrivance for multiplication and division of numbers, and in his lessons in astronomy he used a wonderfully constructed sphere to show forth the positions and the motions of the heavenly bodies. Of these facts we are certain from his own writings. It is less certain, however, that he constructed a kind of rude telescope, although we know from his own letters that he was in the habit of taking his pupils at night to view the actual positions of the stars and mark them in the artificial sphere. Here again legend takes up the narrative and tells us that, by the assistance of the evil one, he constructed an automaton that could nod its head and speak, and which he consulted in all the important affairs of his career. Fables such as this are of interest in so far as they bear witness to the acknowledged greatness of the man. His success as a teacher was so great and his reputation so widespread that pupils flocked to Rheims from every part of France and Germany.

In 983 his peaceful career as a teacher was interrupted. Otto II had succeeded his father as "Caesar and Augustus," and, like his father, held Gerbert in high esteem. The affairs of the monastery of Bobbio in Italy having become very un-

satisfactory owing to outside aggression and internal mismanagement, the Emperor had the master of the school at Rheims transferred to the ancient Abbey of St. Columban. There, in the fastnesses of the Apennines, among a strange people who misunderstood him and misrepresented him, he showed that he could be loyal to his imperial patron, energetic in the assertion of his feudal rights, impartial in the administration of justice, severe towards persistent wrongdoers and forgiving towards his personal foes. His life was not a happy one. His only consolation was the library which, ever since the days when Columban and the other Irish monks settled down in that wild inhospitable region, had been rich in manuscripts relating to profane as well as sacred sciences. There, moreover, he found the books of the Roman *agrimensores,* or land surveyors of the Roman Empire, and in those, as a mathematician, he took special delight. He was not content, however, with what he found there, but sought in every way to increase the literary treasures of the monastery. He never stopped at expense where books were concerned, and when money considerations did not avail he could have recourse to other motives. From his letters we see how he entreated, pleaded, cajoled and wheedled when it was a question of securing some precious manuscript or a copy of it. He was an inveterate booklover, and, as some of us, perhaps, know to our cost, a true bibliophile considers that "all is fair" in love of books. Indeed, Gerbert seems more like a fifteenth certury humanist than a tenth century abbot in the letters in which his zeal for book collecting appears.

At the end of a year he gave up his residence at Bobbio and returned to his classes at Rheims. Henceforth, however, the untroubled peace of former days was to be his no longer. He was drawn inevitably into the stormy events which mark the history of the end of the tenth century. After the death of of his friend Adalbero and the doubtful, or at least contested, election of Arnoul, Gerbert was elected Archbishop of Rheims. His election, also, was contested. He was transferred in 998 to the see of Ravenna, and in 999 was elected Pope and took the title of Sylvester II.

With his career as head of the Church we are not concerned here except to remark that he had a truly enlightened view of the dignity of that office. His chief care was to restore order and peace in Christendom, and to accomplish that he was willing to sacrifice his personal feelings. The trouble both at Bobbio and at Rheims he settled in the most generous spirit by confirming in the one case the appointment of the man who had caused him the greatest annoyance, and in the other that of his rival Arnoul. He is generally credited with having first given form to the idea which afterwards materialised in the Crusades, and whatever may be our verdict of those expeditions, in detail sometimes painful enough to contemplate, no one can deny that the idealism which they evoked was just what the Christian world needed most at the time. His reign as Supreme Pontiff was very brief. His death occurred in 1003, just four years after his election. The circumstances of his death are unknown to us now; for his enemies of a later date and the enemies of the papacy have woven a most wonderful tale of magic and sorcery which obscures the historical facts.

According to legend, Gerbert had sold his soul to the devil in exchange for assistance and enlightenment in his studies and inventions. The bargain was explicit enough. Gerbert was to have all the secrets of the black arts so as to enable him to construct ingenious and weird instruments and solve the riddles of mathematics and astronomy. The devil was to have the soul of Gerbert at the last. There was, however, a proviso that, namely, the scholar and future pope should visit the Holy Land before he died. The deed, we suppose, was duly signed and sealed. But the philosopher had, apparently, the advantage. All he had to do was to delay his visit to the Holy Land, and so put off the day of reckoning. Thus the devil was defeated; but only for the time. He bided his chance. And it came when, one day, Pope Sylvester went to officiate at the Church of Santa Croce in Rome where a portion of the soil of the Holy Land is preserved in front of one of the altars. No sooner had the pope stepped on this spot than the

devil came and claimed the fulfillment of the contract. It was, one realizes, a credulous age, and one that dearly loved a marvellous tale. What surprises us is that a later age should accept the fable and use it to the discredit of the papacy. For us it has value like the other legends about Gerbert, because it is the tribute of popular fancy to the extraordinary greatness of a scholar, whose learning seemed to be more than human.

What, then, were Gerbert's real attainments, and what is his importance in the history of medieval thought? In the first place, he enjoyed great renown in his own day and for many centuries after his time as a teacher of mathematics. It is often said that he introduced the Arabic system of numbers into Christian Europe. This, however, is a statement which is only partly true. More than four centuries before his time the Christian martyr Boethius used a system of number signs very like those which we nowadays call Arabic numerals. Bernelius, a disciple of Gerbert, used a modified form of these Boetian *apices*, as they were called, numerals from one to nine. But, neither Boethius nor Gerbert nor Bernelinus used the zero, or cipher. That seems to have been first used in arithmetic by Mahommed-ibn-Mousa, surnamed Alkharismi or Alchwarismi, who lived in the first half of the ninth century but was not known to Latin Europe until a century or two later. The introduction of the zero, of course, facilitated in a wonderful degree the expression of numbers and the processes of arithmetic. What Gerbert seems to have done is to have introduced a system of columns, so that numbers would receive definite value in units, tens, hundreds, thousands, etc. according to the column in which they were placed. Imagine trying to handle the Roman system of numerals, the C, the M, the X, L and V in a complicated process of multiplication or division. The task, as I say, was very much facilitated when the nine signs were introduced by Boethius, and still more so when Gerbert's system was added, by which the numeral received its value from the *position* or column. This seems to have been the chief merit of his Abacus, or adding machine, and so

greatly was the invention appreciated that for a long time an Abacist was commonly called a Gerbertist.

Gerbert's contributions to geometry were of a practical nature, applications, one might say, of the theory to practical questions, the science which in some countries is still known as mensuration. On this point, however, it would not be safe to go very far into the discussion of his originality, because the whole matter turns on some intricate questions of paleography, the authenticity and age of certain manuscript works on geometry. Of greater interest are the applications which he made of geometry to the science of astronomy. Mention has already been made of the spheres which he constructed, "to show forth the glories of the heavens," and of the telescope which he is said to have invented. Examining very closely the texts in which these inventions are described, we are forced to conclude that, while the spheres were, indeed, very ingenious for that age, the *tubes* which are described in the text were not made for the purpose of enlarging the apparent size of the stars but merely in order the better to determine the positions of the heavenly bodies; and so, there was in this invention of Gerbert, nothing of the principle of the telescope. He did construct clocks, however, which were considered wonderful in those days, though, once more, we must not exaggerate. The clocks that he constructed were sundials, and, although his were evidently very cleverly and accurately made, the principle was far from being new, sundials having been known in Greece as far back as the sixth century before Christ.

As a philosopher Gerbert was far from possessing either the magnificent universality of genius that characterized St. Augustine or the extraordinary originality of John the Scot. With metaphysics, psychology and the philosophy of nature he seems to have concerned himself very little. His activity as a teacher and a writer was confined to problems of logic, as we now call it, dialectic, as it was called in his day. As a logician he did a double service to the cause of philosophy: he resumed in his teaching the inheritance of the past and he made a distinct contribution to logical method. His prede-

cessors in the ninth century—with the exception of John the Scot—did nothing but preserve the logical texts of Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius and Cicero, and write commentaries on them. Gerbert did this too, but, owing to his diligent search in the libraries of France and Italy, he was in possession of a richer literature than was accessible to those who went before him, and he did his work as commentator in a more erudite fashion, with greater wealth of illustration and wider range of reading. His original contribution to logical method is his work "On Reasonable and Using Reason," a title which sounds unintelligible, but which can be made clear by recounting an event that took place in 980 or 981, while he was still head of the school at Rheims.

There was at Magdeburg in Germany a teacher of logic named Otric, whose renown beyond the Rhine was as great as Gerbert's in France. Otric had heard of Gerbert, and was anxious to come to a war of wits with him. So, he sent a disciple to Rheims, who incorrectly, it seems, reported that Gerbert, while strong in rhetoric, was weak in logic, and taught a division of philosophical branches which was not logical. The Emperor Otto II knew Gerbert's ability, and was all too willing to witness a contest between the two teachers. Like Charlemagne, perhaps, he was one of those patrons of learning who delight to pit scholar against scholar and do it not without a certain kind of malice. Besides, it was an age of military tournaments. Emperors, kings and nobles loved the brilliant display of personal prowess, and jousting, as it was called, was a favorite pastime in the intervals between actual combats, or even in the brief intermissions of a campaign. In the winter of 980 an opportunity occurred for an encounter between Gerbert and Otric. Both the German and the French teacher were in the train of the Emperor as he journeyed through Northern Italy. At Ravenna the contest was arranged, and there, in the presence of Otto and his court, surrounded by scholars and ecclesiastics of every rank, the contestants stepped into the arena and began their contest, in which learning and dialectical skill were the weapons employed,

and the laws of logic the only rule of the game. We have, fortunately a detailed account of this picturesque disputation from the pen of the historian Richer who was a contemporary and a disciple of Gerbert. Some of the questions discussed may seem futile to us; we may wonder that the ruler of three kingdoms, "Caesar and Augustus," as he was reverently styled, the Head of the Holy Roman Empire, whose word was law in Western Europe, should sit all day long and preside at a discussion about the meanings of words and the subtle divisions of philosophy. But we should remember that the age had other standards than ours, and who can say whether a future generation will not condemn as meaningless many of the questions which to us seem so vital and worthy of discussion? Gerbert and Otric first took up the definition of philosophy, which they agreed is "the science of things human and divine" —the words are Cicero's and indicate an almost humanistic view, considering that many of Gerbert's predecessors had defined philosophy as "the art of living a Christian life"— a pragmatic Christian view, if one may so style it. From the definition of philosophy they went on to the question of the purpose of philosophy, and here again Gerbert is almost a humanist. Philosophy, he says, in substance, is its own purpose: the knowledge of things human and divine is the justification of the philosopher's efforts. Thence they went off, on a tangent, as we say, to discuss the causes of shadows, and, so, to a number of other topics, the transition not being always apparent in Richer's narrative. The contestants were still undaunted and evidently in as good form as ever when, at the end of the winter's day the Emperor closed the debate. We can sympathise with him when we recall that his interest in philosophy was not very profound. We can, indeed, imagine that the pleasure of witnessing so novel an encounter soon grew less, and tediousness took the place of the zest with which he opened the debate. The honors, apparently, rested with Gerbert; so, at least his admirer Richer would have us believe.

Gerbert, however, was not satisfied with the result. When the Emperor put an end to the contest the question before the

assembly was this: There is a rule of Aristotelian logic as interpreted by Porphyry to the effect that the predicate of a proposition should always have wider extension than the subject. Thus, we judge that: "All trees are plants," "All lions are animals"; "plants" has a wider extension than "trees," and "animals" has a wider extension than "lions." How, then, can we say "A Reasonable Being uses reason," since "Using reason," the predicate, is not wider in extension, but narrower, than "Reasonable?" To this problem, therefore, Gerbert devotes his treatise "On Reasonable and Using Reason," which he dedicates to the Emperor Otto II. The "Little Book" (*libellus*) as he calls it, does not, indeed, interest us on account of the problem which it discusses. We care very little now for Porphyry and his artificial rules of logic. But the method used by Gerbert is interesting, for it is that which was later developed by Abelard, and still further perfected in the thirteenth century, until it became the recognized manner of debating a question in the medieval schools. The "Scholastic Method" as it is called, is now very generally discarded, although it is still in force in academic debates in Catholic Schools of Theology. To those who have never used it or seen it used, a description would only make confusion worse confounded. Let us then be content with recording here the verdict of hostile critics that the scholastic method of debate, while dry and unprofitable as to results in the line of discovery, has very distinct merits as a measure of mental discipline. It proceeds by strict syllogistic argumentation and accurate distinction and definition. It leaves no room for rhetorical display. It holds the disputants strictly to the point, and is calculated to reveal a fallacy or puncture a sophism more quickly than any other method that has been used in discussion. It is severe; but so is all discipline that is profitable. And if it is judged by its results, it has not altogether failed. For it has produced men capable of accurate and sustained reasoning. It has precised philosophical terminology in the schools, and, according to no less a critic than Sir William Hamilton, whom no one surely will accuse of partiality, it

has given to the languages of Western Europe whatever precision they have in the technical use of words. Hamilton says: "To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are indebted for what precision and analytic subtlety they possess"—words which are placed without comment by John Stuart Mill at the head of the first chapter of his *System of Logic*. And Carlyle writes: "It was the schoolmen who made the languages of Europe what they now are. We laugh at the quiddities of these writers now, but in truth these quiddities are just the parts of their language that we have rejected, whilst we never think of the mass we have adopted and have in daily use" (*Table Talk*, 58). The so-called Latin mind, which we are beginning, I may say, to know and admire, has been trained to a great extent in the scholastic method, which the Latins were the last to discard. We are learning now to appreciate the strength of the Latin mind, and its talent for clearness, its suppleness and its accuracy, its singular combination of aesthetic appreciation and logical precision. All these qualities it owes in a measure to the method so long in vogue in the medieval schools. Gerbert's little book, therefore, despite the minuteness of the problem it discusses and the triviality of the rules of logic which occasioned it, is a precious little volume to one who sees in it the first formal adoption of the scholastic method of debate.

If we turn now from Gerbert's technical works on mathematics and logic to his Letters we find there a "philosophy" in the popular sense of the word. Gerbert was a Christian Stoic. That is to say, he had fortified himself by a general view of human life and its vicissitudes which enabled him to bear with patience and submission the trials and sufferings to which he was exposed, and to possess his own soul in patience amid circumstances that would have disturbed another or driven a less disciplined soul to despair. All human events, he reflects, are ruled by Divine Providence: in everything that happens we should see the Will of God, which when it brings us peace and happiness, we bless, and to which, when it brings us trials and misfortune we should submit with patience and

resignation. It was a favorite maxim of his that: "If we cannot have what we desire, we should desire that which we can have," a saying quoted from the poet Terence. All through the *Letters* there runs a plaintive note, a longing for peace. Gerbert was a Benedictine, and the motto of that ancient and scholarly congregation was *Pax*. He was destined to have very little peace, except during the ten years that he spent as teacher at Rheims. That was probably why he sought it so assiduously and longed for it so pathetically. Though he was called into the world of affairs and took an active part in the political life of his time, his inclination always was toward a life of learned leisure and the peace of scholastic occupations. His dissertations on friendship are in the same lofty strain of Christian Stoicism. "If God has given to man anything greater than friendship, I know it not." Friendship is the bond which binds families, cities and nations, nay even the whole world. Between friends all things are common, not only external goods, but thoughts and sentiments as well. "One heart and one mind," as he said in reference to his own friend, Adalbero. He had the true Stoic disdain for the commonplace, and showed on more than one occasion how one may conquer pettiness and malice by showing true greatness of mind. When, as Pope, he was called on to judge the case of Arnoul, his former rival at Rheims, he wrote a letter full of dignity and condescension, in which he did not minimize the guilt of the accused, but reminded him that the executive clemency was one of the prerogatives of the See of Saint Peter, and in virtue of that prerogative he confirmed Arnoul in the See of Rheims and all the privileges thereto belonging. Once only did he seem to compromise with his lofty ideals. And that was when, as secretary of Arnoul, he deserted the Ottos who had befriended him and went over to the cause of Hugh Capet. The defection was a momentary lapse. For his own conscience soon troubled him and his sense of benefits received would not let him rest until he had returned to his allegiance. He has been accused of hardheartedness. But his letters and his conduct fully disprove the accu-

sation. On the contrary, we know him to have been kindhearted and truehearted, loyal to his friends in adversity, grateful to his old teachers at Aurillac, and risking his reputation as a Churchman in his effort to befriend his own relatives who were dependent on his care. He had the proper sense of the value of money. Its best use he considered was in almsgiving, and its next best in the purchase of books: and he had a right to spend it as he wished, since it was acquired, he reminds us, "proprio labore," by his work as a teacher.

In order to understand how a man so admirable in his personal conduct and so exceptionally well endowed in intellectual talents could be misrepresented and calumniated it is necessary to recall that the times were credulous and that confusion in political life engendered bitter enmities. Then, as was remarked before, it was a prevailingly ignorant age. Those who were themselves ignorant affected to distrust as well as despise all learning. Mathematics especially was suspected because of the use of mystic numbers in magic. Astronomy, too, was considered dangerous because of the practices of the astrologers. Besides, in a superstitious age the extraordinary is always suspected of being somehow uncanny. And, yet, it was not Gerbert's contemporaries, but his successors that first accused him of sorcery and invented legends about him. Hatred of the papacy in the days of the stern Hildebrand was the impelling motive in the fabrication of the Gerbert legends. To his contemporaries, the scholar, the teacher, the abbot, prelate and pope must have been known as he is known to us from his letters and his writings. Hatred dies hard. Readers of Victor Hugo will recall how, in order to attack Napoleon III and Pius IX, the French dramatist revives in his "Welf, castellan d'Osbor" the old misrepresentations and holds up the Gerbert of legendary infamy as a prototype of Pius IX, while in the Otto of his drama he would have us see the lineaments of the third Napoleon. A contemporary French scholar, M. Picavet, who has made a profound study of the philosopher-pope, but who, is must be said, is a partisan neither of the papacy nor of the philosophy of the schools,

is properly indignant at their singular instance of historical travesty. He concludes his remarks by saying: "If we place ourselves at the modern point of view, exclusively, setting aside every preoccupation as historians or as Christians, we must record our verdict that Gerbert invariably followed the search for truth and strove for the triumph of justice—justice, which however, he knew how to perfect by considerations of charity. This alone entitles us to count him among those who were great in the eyes of their contemporaries and are still in the eye of posterity." [1]

Gerbert's influence will appear in the subsequent development of medieval thought. The school at Rheims over which he presided was the mother of many schools throughout France, which flourished in the following centuries, were centers of philosophic activity in the days of St. Anselm and Abelard, and not only developed scholastic philosophy up to the era of its greatest perfection, but prepared the way for the intellectual activity of the end of the twelfth century, out of which the first medieval universities sprang. At Chartres especially, where stands today the most magnificent example of French Gothic architecture, there were gathered under Fulbert, a disciple of Gerbert, a group of scholars who by independent philosophical speculation, and by an enlightened, almost a Humanistic, appreciation of the classics, kept thought and taste alive in France until the days of Anselm and Abelard. Every generation owes something to that which goes before it. If the parent generation has not increased, it has at least done something to preserve, the inheritance of the past. In this way, then, the tenth century may receive credit for what was done in the eleventh and twelfth, and Gerbert who sums up what was best in the tenth century may be said to be the teacher of the better known scholastics who came after him.

WILLIAM TURNER.

[1] Gerbert, *un pape philosophe*, Paris, 1897, p. 221.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Private Ownership: Its Basis and Equitable Conditions. By Rev. I. Kelleher. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. New York: Benziger Bros. $1.25.

In the preface to this excellent book the author says: "Our present evil conditions are not only utterly unsatisfactory but so completely discredited that they cannot possibly continue nor should anyone possessed of a particle of humane feeling desire their continuance, even though it were possible." This frank condemnation of present conditions is reiterated throughout his work, the purpose of which, nevertheless, is to defend the principle of private ownership against socialism, so, one need not be told, Father Kelleher seeks to show that the only escape from the dangers of the present rapidly growing social crisis lies in the direction of drastic reform through the power of the State of the enormous evils to which the abuse of private ownership has led. The success, such as it is, of the Socialist agitation, he says, is due not to any virtues in the system itself but solely to the rottenness of the order against which it is a protest. The gist of Father Kelleher's work, and its distinctive value, consists in this, that, whilst it duly defends the legitimacy of private ownership, it insists very strongly on the duties and limitations of ownership; important considerations which too many of the defenders of the sacred rights of property are apt to pass over too lightly. How many of our moralists in their treatment of this subject, content themselves with setting forth in strong light the indisputable but not very far-reaching principle, *in extrema necessitate omnia fiunt communia,* and then, as if this were the last word that justice had to say in the matter, they transfer the case to the jurisdiction of charity?

The book opens with an introductory chapter containing a brief, but, for the task in hand, sufficiently detailed history of the Socialist movement from Marx to the present day. The doctrines of Marx, the modifications which they have undergone, with the result of dividing Socialists into two distinct parties are very

clearly stated. The present position and the respective policies of the two parties, the Revolutionists and the Revisionists, or Evolutionists, are carefully defined. A failure to make this distinction diminishes very considerably the polemical efficiency of a great deal of otherwise strong writing directed against Socialism. In his general discussion Fr. Kelleher takes the Revisionist type for his target. "Gradually," he believes, "the dogmas that seemed essential to Marxian Socialism—the Materialistic interpretation of history, the war between the Classes, the Catastrophic Theory, etc., have come to be abandoned or ignored." One is inclined to place a note of interrogation after this statement. It is true that as Fr. Kelleher adds, the most influential protagonists of Socialism at present belong to the evolutionary school. But, on the other hand, as a competent judge, Miss Hughan, in her recently published survey of American Socialism, as it exists to-day, shows, while the present policy of the national socialist party leans towards constructivism, it follows, in general, the policies of the German Marxians led by Kautsky. (*American Socialism of the Present Day*, p. 237.)

The second chapter is taken up with the origin and nature of individual rights; "one of which," the exposition shows, "is an indefinite right all men have received equally from God, for he has commissioned all to live on the fruits of the earth." "All Christians must admit such a right; and all, whether Christians or not, will admit it if I abstract from its origin and say simply that all men have a right to a means of living from the bounty of the earth." Having then explained how, through the intervention of social authority this indefinite right is transformed into definite rights in material goods Father Kelleher takes up the criticism of Socialism, or, more precisely, collectivism, that is, the socialistic economic theory. It is one of the merits of his method that Fr. Kelleher treats the economic theory by itself, apart from the sociological theories and anti-religious principles which are propounded in association with it by many socialists, but which other socialists desirous of conciliating those who oppose the system on moral and religious grounds, declare to be no part of Socialism. With regard to these sociological views, which he refutes, he observes: "That distinctive conception of society which I have called socialistic is not essential to Socialism as such; in fact it would be vehemently repudiated by all the earlier socialists

as well as by not a few eminent socialists at present. Still as socialism should inevitably modify the constitution, and as this concept appears peculiarly adapted to the economic and political conditions that Socialism is striving for, and as, in fine, it is propounded as socialistic and defended by prominent exponents of socialism, there can be no objection to our giving it the name socialistic. Although all socialists would not accept this concept it is of the utmost importance for us to be warned against it, for whether formally professed or not it is very frequently at the bottom of the advocacy by socialist and non-socialist of extensive and compulsory state interference which would be little consistent with individual independence."

Against Collectivism Fr. Kelleher urges the usual arguments based on the difficulty or the impossibility of instituting a satisfactory scheme for the assignment of labor, for the regulation of production, for the distribution of the product of labor, the absence of an adequate incentive to vigorous effort, and of any safeguard for individual liberty against a vast bureaucracy armed with enormous power and in complete control of the press.

Socialism having been weighed and found wanting, Fr. Kelleher next lays down the ethics of private ownership, emphasising especially the limitations to which all private property is subjected through the existence of the indefinite right of all the community to a living. He repudiates the *laissez-faire* principle as a grossly unjust abuse of the principle of individualism, and argues very effectively that it is not only the right but the duty of the State to exercise its power of jurisdiction in order to abolish the present iniquities.

Having specified in a general way, what these evils are, Fr. Kelleher discusses the question of reform; is it to be prosecuted on individualist or on evolutionary socialist lines? He replies, of course, on individualist lines. For, though the greater part of the practical programme of this party might be, and, in fact, is advocated by the individualist reformer also, the very important difference between the individualist reformer and the evolutionary socialist is that while the first values these measures of amelioration for their intrinsic worth, the latter pursues them chiefly as provisional gains contributing to the ultimate establishment of collectivism. To everybody engaged in the work of combatting the spread of socialist doctrines this book will prove invaluable.

J. J. Fox.

Socialism and the Workingman. By R. Fullerton, B. D., B. C. L. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son. New York: Benziger.

It is perhaps somewhat unkind to this little book to place it alongside the one just noticed, for it must suffer severely by comparison. Its purpose, the author informs us is to set forth briefly and plainly "the fundamental principles which govern the relations of man to man and which must be maintained in accordance with the dictates of the Natural Law in any proposed solution of the problem that at present confronts society; and then to take a glance at the solution of present day difficulties which the socialists propose."

In his preliminary exposition of the nature of private ownership the author fails to bring out the limitations imposed on ownership by the common right of all to a living. He admits, indeed, that in case of grave necessity the State can provide for the common welfare out of private property. But he affirms that this is only lawful in order to avoid national disaster; and says, furthermore: "It is the bounden duty of the State to uphold and safeguard the rights of its members, to prevent and punish violations of these rights, to secure private individuals in peace and tranquility in the enjoyment of what is theirs; and if the State fails in this it neglects its duty; but if it attempts to go further and interfere with the sacredness of private ownership then it oversteps its duty, flagrantly violates the precepts of the natural law." If this were true, then to borrow an example from Fr. Kelleher, a few colliery owners might, if it so pleased them, shut up their mines, and condemn thirty or forty thousand miners and their families to starvation; and if the State interfered with these proprietors in thus exercising their sacred rights of ownership the State would flagrantly violate the natural law!

The author strongly denounces socialism as anti-religious and subversive of all morality. He justifies this condemnation by numerous and ample citations from socialist writers, such as are to be found in Mr. Balfour's armory "The Case Against Socialism." He, however, somewhat strains the evidence in order to present socialism as exclusively of the revolutionary type; indeed though he mentions evolutionary socialism he almost completely disregards it and the character of its programme. Yet it is evo-

lutionary socialism that, generally speaking, is just now presented by the socialist propaganda to the workingman, and the workingman thus prepossessed would most likely refuse to place any confidence in an adviser who would draw the picture of socialism exclusively from the data here furnished. Nor would any socialist admit, and we should not care to have imposed on us the task of convincing him, that the evil consequences of the stupid English poor relief system furnish us with the means of forecasting how the masses of the population would refuse to work if socialism were once put into practice. It would be fair game too, for a socialist confronted with the respective arguments of Mr. Fullerton and Fr. Kelleher, to comment sarcastically on the fact that while the latter describes socialism as sure to terminate in a reign of boundless despotism over the toilers, the latter assures us that under the socialist regime the laboring classes would shirk work altogether and there would be no means available to compel them to furnish labor sufficient to support themselves.

J. J. Fox.

Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, von Dr. Martin Grabmann. Zweiter Band: Die Scholastiche Methode im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert. Herder, Freiburg and St. Louis, 1911. Price $2.95 net.

This is the second volume of a very valuable work on the history of scholastic method by the learned professor of Dogmatic Theology in the episcopal Lyceum of Eichstätt. Like the first volume, it shows a thoroughness, a width of information and a keenness of judgment which are rare in histories of scholasticism. The author avails himself not only of printed sources but, to a very great extent, of manuscript sources also. When it is remembered that the scholastic method was determined in all its essentials by the struggle between rationalism and mysticism which took place in the twelfth century, this volume, which treats so learnedly of that century will be studied eagerly by all who wish to know what the scholastic method was, both in philosophy and in theology. It is no exaggeration to say that the work is the only one in any language which treats the subject adequately from the historical

side. Every teacher of the history of philosophy and every teacher of dogmatic theology will find the work indispensable.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Father Lacombe. The Black-Robe Voyageur. By Katherine Hughes. Illustrated. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1911. 8°, pp. xxvi + 467.

This is the biography of an Oblate priest, a missionary, who commenced his apostolic career as far back as 1849 and who is still in his declining years active and zealous in the cause of religion. The book is interesting beyond the ordinary, as well because the subject of the narrative is typically American, being of mixed French and Indian blood, as because his life was spent amid scenes which are fast disappearing from the western continent as civilization progresses. Over and above these however, is the interest which comes from a record of unselfish and self-sacrificing effort to bring to the pagan aborigines of the country the truths and blessings of religion. What the life of a missionary in those distant days was can be understood only from such a narrative as this. A clever touch is imparted to the book by the references to Lord Strathcona, the Empire-builder and life-long friend of Father Lacombe. The work of neither suffers by contrast with the work of the other, though the zealous labors and fruitful efforts of Father Lacombe as the founder of the Empire of religion comes out into stronger light when placed side by side with those of the great statesman and builder of the Northwest. Father Lacombe is fortunate in his biographer, whose sympathy and insight into his purposes and his projects have enabled her to write an account of his life which brings out its nobleness and greatness without resort to exaggeration or rhetoric.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Primitive Catholicism. By Mgr. Pierre Batiffol, Litt. D. Translation by Henri L. Brianceau, of St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, from the fifth French edition of *L'Église Naissante,* revised by the author. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, 1911. 8vo., pp. xxviii + 424.

This book may be considered the culmination of centuries of polemics between Catholics and Protestants, and it shows that the appeal made to history so long ago by Protestant controversialists has resulted merely in the confirmation of the Catholic position. It is a long cry from the "Magdeburg Centuriators" to Batiffol, but the underlying cause of the discussion has remained the same: did Christ found the Church and is the Church He founded the Catholic Church of today? Protestantism has found its latest and best exponent or defender in Harnack of Berlin, and it was with the view of combating the views of Harnack and assailing liberal Protestantism in its last stronghold that this work was written. Batiffol here presents the "history of the formation of Catholicism, that is to say, of the Church in so far as it is a visible, universal society built upon the framework of a rule of faith and a hierarchy" down to and including the time of St. Cyprian. The enormous learning and minute accuracy with which the subject is handled reflect the long and laborious preparation which preceded the composition of this book. The subject is discussed in eight chapters: 1. The Jewish Dispersion and Christianity. 2. The Infant Church. 3. The Infant Church (continued). 4. The Catholicism of St. Irenaeus. 5. The Case of Clement of Alexandria. 6. Tertullian's Variations. 7. Origen and Greek Orthodoxy. 8. St. Cyprian and Rome. The mere enumeration of these titles, however, gives no indication of the fullness and accuracy with which the subject is treated. All the literature of the early Church is carefully analyzed and accurately appraised, the writings of modern authors are thoroughly sifted with the result that we have here a work to which no objection can be raised on the ground that any of the laws or requirements of modern scientific historiography has been violated or neglected. Many advantages will accrue to Catholicism from the publication of this work. In the first place it will serve to clear away a swarm of half-formulated theories regarding the early days of

Christianity which are the result of applying evolutionary theory to history, and it will bring out into clearer light the fact that the Church was "from her origin a living and divinely assisted preservation of the gift made by God to men in the Incarnation." Though the last word on this important subject has not been said, and though the work of Batiffol will not by any means put an end to controversy, he has placed the opponents of Catholicism represented by those who rejected the Church and based their claims on the Bible alone, in the anomalous position of saying in the words of Harnack that 'the chasm that separates Jesus from the apostles has not yet been bridged over nor can it be."

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism. By Franz Cumont. With an Introductory Essay by Grant Showerman. Authorized Translation. The Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago, 1911. 8vo., pp. xxvi + 298.

This volume contains a series of lectures delivered in 1905 at the Collège de France, supplemented by others given at Oxford a few months later where the author was invited "to develop certain subjects which he had touched upon at Paris." The translation is made from the revised second edition published in 1909.

The purpose which the author had in mind was to show that the religious syncretism arising from the presence and commingling of so many different pagan creeds in the Roman Empire had the result of essentially modifying the dry, formal cult of the Romans themselves and of giving rise to a higher form of religion better calculated to satisfy the religious ideas and cravings of mankind. There are eight chapters dealing respectively with:—Rome and the Orient; Why the Oriental Religions Spread; Asia Minor; Egypt; Syria; Persia; Astrology and Magic; The Transformation of Roman Paganism. The study of the religions of the different localities mentioned is not a presentation of their essential features, but of the modifications they underwent and especially the changes they caused in religious concepts after their spread to other parts of the Empire. A subject so vast discussed so briefly, necessarily implies that the author takes much for

granted and that he does not prove all his assertions. It is needless to say that M. Cumont has an enormous array of fact at his disposal; but his theories will not always hold water. Though well aware of the dangers of such generalization, and though he warns his readers that "resemblance does not necessarily presuppose imitation, and frequently a similarity of ideas and practices must be explained by a common origin, exclusive of any borrowing," M. Cumont can hardly be exonerated from the charge of having envisaged the pagan cults somewhat in the light of the Christian Church, and of having read to some extent Christian organization and Christian ideas into them. Unwarranted statements or statements requiring proof are met with on nearly every page. Thus, p. 21, speaking of the reasons for the spread of the oriental religions, Cumont appeals to the fact that occidental paganism was almost exclusively Latin under the Empire, and finds either a conclusion or confirmation of this in the additional statement that, "by imposing her speech upon the inhabitants of Ireland and Germany, Christian Rome simply continued the work of assimilation in the barbarian provinces subject to her influence that she had begun while pagan." No more misleading or erroneous opinions regarding the spread of the Latin liturgy in the West can be conceived than this. It is regrettable that M. Cumont has not given the subject more consideration. Another evidence of the same readiness to make positive statements without explanation or modification is found on the following page: "It is a characteristic fact that the worship of the deified Emperors, the only official worship required of every one by the government as a proof of loyalty, should have originated of its own accord in Asia, received its inspiration from the purest monarchic traditions, and revived in form and spirit the veneration accorded to the Diadochi by their subjects." Tacitus (Ann., I, 78), says: *Templum ut in colonia Tarraconensi strueretur Augusto petentibus Hispanis permissum, datumque in omnes provincias exemplum,* and the authority of Tacitus counts for something.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Bossuet, Correspondance, publiée sous le patronage de l'Académie Français, par Ch. Urbain et E. Levesque, Vols. I-IV. Paris, 1909-1911.

France has a way of paying national honor to her great writers which is not possible to us *de langue anglaise,* in England or America. The edition of which this work forms part, *Les grands Écrivains de la France,* published by Hachette, is a sort of canonization by the highest literary tribunal of France, the French Academy, a proclamation that the authors so honored have attained what may be called heroic excellence in literature. Their works are edited, in a monumental edition, with all the carefulness employed by the best scholars in their editions of the Greek and Latin classics, but with the greater thoroughness and completeness that are possible in dealing with modern productions.

That Bossuet should find a place in this standard edition was of course to be expected. He holds a rank in French literature accorded to no English writer who has chosen religion as the theme. He did not write to please, his pages are not eloquent for the sake of eloquence. He was intent only upon the fit expression of his ideas and sentiments, but he expressed them with the force, the elevation and the copiousness of his native genius; so that, though he is a Christian and a churchman above all, France, religious, irreligious and indifferent, cherishes him as a national glory.

The works to which we are calling attention comprise the first four volumes of Bossuet's correspondence (1651-1691); they will be complete in ten volumes. They are edited by two Catholic priests, M. Ch. Urbain, a fine literateur, well known for his minute acquaintace with the seventeenth century, and M. E. Levesque, former editor of the *Revue Bossuet* and discoverer of many Bossuet manuscripts as well as one of the most distinguished scriptural scholars of France. Only men like these with deep and solid knowledge of theology and Scripture could be competent to edit the correspondence of this prince of controversialists. They have taken infinite pains to light up every obscure passage—necessarily very numerous—in this vast correspondence. They have ransacked parish registers all over France and every contemporary publication in order to glean information about personages and

events commemorated here by Bossuet. The letters are published in chronological order; and, under the guidance of the editors, the modern reader feels he can understand this correspondence almost as well as the men who conducted it. The most valuable features of this new edition, however, which will make it standard and definitive, is the publication of much new material discovered by the editors and the minute verification or rectification of the old. Some former editors took liberties with the text, suppressing or combining or altering as they saw fit, and their successors perpetuated their errors. Here all the letters are published after the originals, if extant and, we have every confidence to believe, with the utmost accuracy; and where the originals have perished, we are put into a position to judge, as far as possible, the fidelity of their first editors. All in all, we have here as perfect a piece of editing as learning, sound judgment and a loving and untiring industry could produce.

We needed the authentic text of Bossuet's letters; and considering the important place occupied by him in the literary, religious and general history of his time, we must be grateful for the immense labor expended on this edition. His correspondence had the widest range, from Louis XIV and Innocent XI down to the obscurest names in history. Probably more has perished than is preserved in the ten volumes which remain. Yet Bossuet was not a born letter-writer; he does not condescend to the leisurely, newsy, chatty letter; he does not write to unburden himself to a friend, unless in some of his spiritual letters; he is a serious man and writes always for a serious purpose, which does not mean that his letters are dull or heavy, no more than his *Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle.* He appears always in these volumes as the churchman of lofty aims who has at heart always the interests of religion and the good of souls. He is the ecclesiastical statesman intent on the reunion of the churches, he is the controversialist against Calvinism and the light of souls seeking the Catholic faith, he is the adviser of the great scholars of his day, he is the very solicitous preceptor of the Dauphin, he is the watchful pastor of his diocese and the high-minded, if not always very penetrating, director of souls. One thing he does not appear, an author jealous and careful of his literary glory; a great genius and a great and simple soul, he puts to shame the lesser geniuses who husband every talent and strain every effort to raise their literary stature.

We see Bossuet reserved and dignified, but not cold nor proud nor hard as he is often pictured. The letters here published antedate the Quietist controversy, from which has come the prejudice which many entertain against Bossuet. The present instalment ends with the letters of 1691, some years before the encounter between Bossuet and his more winning antagonist, and shows Bossuet in his most favorable light.

JOHN F. FENLON.

MISCELLANEOUS.

An Irish Homily on Poverty: Text and Translation.

This Homily, from the same sources as the one given in the *Bulletin* of last month, shows a decided lack of orderly sequence. It is nothing more than a series of citations from various sources, the Bible, the Fathers, the later Theologians, on the subject of poverty. They are quoted to show that poverty as a state of life has not only the approval of the greatest minds of the Christian era, but has as a foundation the declaration of Our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount that poverty is a source of blessings. For it is not with poverty in the sense of privation of the goods of the world, even with the detachment of the mind from riches because of their vanity and the anxieties they bring, which appealed to the pagan Seneca, that the author of the Homily is concerned. He deals with poverty in its Christian sense, which goes beyond the pagan ideal by adding to the conquest of self something more positive, namely, attachment of the mind and heart to the love and service of God and the truth, and moreover makes this positive side the *raison d'être* of the other. How much the world owes to the practice of this Christian virtue during the Middle Ages, historians are doing much to make known to an awakening age. The Homily makes it plain that those who have embraced this state must distinguish between the outward appearance of poverty, which is condemned severely when it exists along with the desire of riches, and the inward reality, or poverty of spirit, by which one follows in the footsteps of the Master, and gains abundant graces which enrich the soul and obtain greater glory for God. The example of Christ, the rewards promised to those who follow Him faithfully, and the necessity of referring everything in this life to a spiritual standard for correct judgment, are constantly insisted upon. Perhaps we should not look for an orderly development of ideas

where the subject-matter displays so close a unity, but should rather be pleased at the variety with which it is presented.

The verification of the citations is frequently a difficult matter owing to their brevity. A certain number, however, have been traced, and their sources indicated in the foot-notes. Nine of the Fathers and Ecclesiastical Writers are cited by name, as well as two books of the Old Testament and three writers of the New. St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great seem to be the favorites, each one being referred to by name six times. Besides, it seems worthy of remark that one of the citations purporting to be from St. Ambrose appears to be in reality from St. Gregory. However, it may be due rather to the imperfection of the indexes available that no trace of such a passage could be found in St. Ambrose's works. One, and possibly two, of the passages ascribed to St. Bernard would appear to be taken from a sermon of the Abbot Guerricus, whose works were at one time attributed to St. Bernard.

TEXT.

(fo 33d l. 29) Do-n bochtacht and so óir ad*eir* bernard *cur*ab *con*aich an-bo*chtacht* toilemhail an-a-*treicter* ca*ch*-æn-ní sæ*gal*ta 7 an-a-len*tar* día co-díles 7 is *con*ach co*m*lan 7 is i*nell*us canguá*sacht* a*n*-bo*chtacht* an-a-fagh*tar* glóir día 7 is *con*aich co fír*in*dech b*eith* a-foch*ar* mu*indtiri* día 7 is *con*aich beith ac-mebrug*adh* na-beatha an-a-tab*airter* gloir do día (fo 34a) .i. na bo*chtacht*[*a*] sp*i*ratalta an-a-len*tar* día co-sær *tri*a *tri*bloid an-tsægail so 7a

Ad*eir* senica an-neach ac-a-fuil móran is mór i*artar* a*ir* 7 a-nech a*r*-a-n-í*artar* mórán is-i*m*da ní n-a-easb*aidh* 7 an-neach ac-a-fuil becan is bec i*artar* a*ir* 7 is-t*er*c ní n-a-esb*aidh* gu*r*ab a*ir*e si*n* ad*eir* b*ernard* cu*r*ab fonomaid*ech* do nech b*eith* bo*cht* sa-sæ*gal* monabfuil sé saidhb*ir* ac día ac-*furtacht* na-fír*in*de is-na-h-ecl*ais*ib 7 i*n*-a-*contrárdh*a so is-i*m*da ac-*furtacht* na-h-anfír*in*de ac-gabail anma día co-di*m*sach 7 aibídi *crábaidh* 7 ac-*cur* a-ngním 7 a-mbés an-a-h-ag*aidh* 7 cret ele sin *acht* nech do b*eith* ac-foghn*am* do-*n*-diab*al* 7 ac-tarcaisniughad dia co-mór. 7.

Ad*eir* pilosup*us* sanc*dus* cad hí fe*in* an bo*chtacht* .ni *annsa* .i. maith shofhúath*uight*i hí 7 *máthair* na-slainti 7 teth*edh* na-ndeithidi 7 can b*eith* di*m*æin hí 7 casain na-h-*eg*na 7 ullmug*adh* na-ndegoibr*igh*ti can damnad hí 7 *seal*b nem-*con*aich 7 sealb can-iúl hí .i. can iúl ca-fuil 7 hé acatt 7 conách neimf-ní hí. 7a

Ad*eir* casiod*orus* *cur*ab acfa*in*dech an *con*ach atá ac-na-bo*cht*aib .i. m*ét* a-sláinti a-f*or*bfailti na cat*r*ach ne*m*da 7 *cur*ab é is cara didin dóib an br*eith*em co-a-tíagat na h-uile do-chum a-breitheamnais. 7 ad*eir*

Ad*eir* ambroci*us* ar-b*riatr*aib Lucais sósc*éluidhe* cidh bé ní doc*r*aidh a-mbéraidh tú a*r* an-du*ine* mbo*cht* ní dligen*n* tú a-tarcaisniug*adh* ann óir ma-do-rin*detar* a droch-besa a-cogcub*us* do lot slaineócar a-l*eighes* na-bo*cht*aine hé 7

Ad*eir* au*gustin* ar-b*riatr*aib i*n*-aps*toil* 7 ar-genicis dá-leanmais Cr*ist* an-a-bo*chtacht* ní bemhaís can b*eith* bo*cht* 7 do b*eith* saidhbris a-cr*aidhe* acai*n*d óir is an-a-bo*chtacht* fe*in* do-ní día saidhbr*es* da ca*ch* ne*ch* co-deigenach ar-a-leanmain fein. 7 ad*eir*

Ad*eir* au*gustin* *cur*-tarcaisn*igh* Chr*ist* ca*ch* uile ní-talman*t*a 7 *cur*-tarcaisn*igh* a-corp féin ind*us* *cur* (fo. 34b) taisbén sé duin*ne* ca*ch* uile ní intarcaisn*igh*ti 7 do-fulai*n*g ca*ch* aidbeirseor*acht* co-foidhid*ech* d-ar-tecu*sc*-ne sa-slidhid *céd*na. 7 a

TRANSLATION.

Of Poverty here, for Bernard says that blessed is voluntary poverty in which all worldly things are forsaken and God is followed faithfully, and this poverty is perfect happiness,[1] and a protection [2] without danger, in which the glory of God is acquired. And it is truly blessed to be in the presence of the servants of God, [in a monastic community], and it is blessed to be meditating on the life wherein glory is given to God, which is spiritual poverty, in which God is followed without hindrance through the tribulation of this world.

And Seneca says:—"Of him who has much, much is asked; and he of whom much is asked, lacks many things; and of the one who has little, little is asked, and few things are lacking him." Hence it is for this reason Bernard says [3] that "it is ridiculous for a man to be poor in the world unless he is rich in the sight of God, by advancing the truth in the churches [as a member of a religious order]; and on the contrary many are giving support to error by arrogantly taking the name of God and the habit of religion, and setting their actions and their way of life at variance with Him." And what else is that but to serve the devil, and to offer a great affront to God?

And the holy philosopher [4] says:—"What is poverty? Not hard to tell.[5] It is a good that is easily hated and the mother of health, and the flight of cares, and freedom from idleness, and the path of wisdom, and the laying up of good works without loss; [6] and

[1] Cf. *Sermo VIII in Ps.* XC, *in fine.*

[2] Cf. *Sermo XLVIII* (alias IV *Ex parvis*), in Luc. X, 38, "Et ipse intravit in quoddam castellum." St. Bernard says:—"Castellum, ubi Christus intravit, voluntaria est paupertas, quæ habitatores suos a gemina impugnatione, qua hujus mundi amatores expugnantur, reddit securos, etc." Possibly the author of the Homily may have had this *castellum* in mind and chosen the word *inellus*, "protection, security," because of its resemblance to *indlis*, "a hall, or court."

[3] This seems to be a citation from Guerricus, a disciple of St. Bernard, whose works are given in Migne (tome 185) in connection with those of his master. The passage referred to is in the "*Sermo in Solemnitate Sanctorum Omnium*," par 5.

[4] St. Thomas Aquinas?

[5] A survival of the Old-Irish formula introducing an answer to a question.

[6] Perhaps in the sense of Matt. VI, 20, "Lay up to yourselves treasures

Adeir augustin curab do-n tæb amuich d-a-gæltibh is eicean da-cach æn le-n-ab-ail Crist do leanmain beith .i. a-slidhi na-bochtaine mar adubramar

Adeir augustin an-neach do-rindi naimdenus ar-a deoraighecht is milis do dol n-a-dúthaigh 7 is mar sin do-n popul pecach do-rinde a-n-aimleas ar-an-sægal so is milis doib dul an-a-ndúthaigh .i. a-flathamnus a-slidhi na-bochtacht[a]

Adeir augustin curab imda slidhi do tecaisc día duinn do dul ó-gradh tseacranach an-tsægail so a-flathamnus a-slidhi na-bochtaineachta. 7

Adeir béda atá ní ac-a-reic acam .i. flathamnus día 7 is air cennaigter hé .i. ar-an-mbochtacht fírindich 7 ar-galar cuirp co-foighidech 7 a-forbfailti 7 a sæthar 7 a-ngorta 7 a-nglóir óir is-í feracht leanmana día do dul n-a-flathamnus an-bochtacht spiratalta. 7 adeir

Adeir béda da-mbeith egna solaim acat 7 socraidecht absolon 7 nert samsoin 7 airdi meic an scáil 7 conach geisi 7 nert octauiánuis 7 luas amsuél cat hé an-tarba do dendais sin duit da-tucta do corp do crumaib 7 t-anam do-n-díabal d-a-adlacad leis an saidhbir sanntach re-n-abarar tantulus an-ifirnn mar adeir an soscél an innad eile. 7

Adeir grigoir ca-fuil ní is glormaire na-in-bochtacht an-a-cennaigter flathamnus dé 7 ca-fuil ní is-docraidhi na hí an-tan-treicter hí ar grad an-tsægail 7 ca-fuil ní is-socraidhi anas-í ac-faghbail luach a-formala .i. flathamnus dé

Adeir grigoir ar gradh na-fírindi do-b-áil lium sib do treicen gradha an-tsægail ó-nách fétaidhi ar[1] leas do denam leis na a-breith lib mar-a-teighti

Oir adeir an-feallsamh ní h-ail leam maith do gairm do-n-ní urcoidech .i. do gradh an-tsægail (fo 34c) 7 bith a-fis acat curab conaich anbochtacht an-a-n-ullmuighter flathamnus día romat 7 an-a-faghtar an-betha tsægalta maillíughadh ecin

Adeir grigoir a-lucht gradhaighti an-tsægail ataithi ac-facbhail ar-ngradha ar eicin tar ar-n-eisi .i. na-spreidi aimsirda óir ní leir díb slainti flathamnais dé trí tría nell nel (*sic*) tsalach an-tsægail. 7

Adeir ieoronbus is-ro-gradach an-ridire ac día do gebann anóir an-tsægail mar bud ail leis fein 7 flathamnus dé fa-deoigh. 7

[1] For *far*, which is translated.

it is wealth without riches, and a possession without knowledge, that is, without knowledge where it is, though you have it; and it is an immaterial wealth."

Cassiodorus [7] says that abundant is the wealth of the poor, namely, the greatness of their assurance of possessing the joy of the heavenly city, and that their protecting friend will be the judge with whom all go to judgment.

Ambrose, commenting on the words of Luke the Evangelist, says:—"Whatever harsh name you give the poor man, you should not give it with contempt, for, if his wretched life has dulled his conscience, he will be healed by the remedy of poverty." [8]

Augustine, commenting on the words of the Apostle and on Genesis, says:—"If we followed Christ in His poverty, we should not be otherwise than poor, and we should have the riches of His heart, for it is in His poverty that God bestows riches on everyone at last after following Him."

Augustine says that Christ despised everything earthly, and that He despised His own body, so that He showed us that everything is worthy of contempt; and He suffered every adversity patiently teaching us to walk in the same path.

Augustine says that everyone who wishes to follow Christ should be away from his relatives, that is, in the path of poverty, as we have said.

Augustine says:—"He who has incurred enmity during his exile, it is sweet for him to go to his own country; and so it is for the race of sinners who have led a vicious life in this world, it is sweet for them to go to their own country, namely, heaven, by the road of poverty."

Augustine says that many are the ways in which God taught us to go from the erring love of this world to heaven by the path of poverty.

in heaven, where neither rust nor moth doth consume," etc. But the word translated "loss" means also "damnation."

[7] Cf. *Expositio in Psalterium*, Ps. IX, v. 9.

[8] The following passage is found in St. Gregory the Great, *Hom.* XL, par. 10:—"Cum quoslibet in hoc mundo abjectos aspicitis, etiamsi qua reprehensibilia eorum esse videantur, nolite despicere, quia fortasse quos morum infirmitas vulnerat, medicina paupertatis curat . . . . Pauper ergo cum reprehensibilis cernitur, moneri debet, despici non debet." Cf. also par. 6. I have found nothing in St. Ambrose resembling the text.

Adeir an-feallsamh da-nderntadhi an-sægal cin tseilb dílis ac-æin-neach do beith flathamnus an-tsída 7 na-h-ænt[acht]a itir na braithreachaibh co dul a-flathamnus dé 7

Adeir casiodorus ata aibeirseoir acam acam (*sic*) ac-techt am-timchill cach læi .i. an-sægal duines-lem-nem-cairdib mo-slidhi .i. mo V cédfadha corpda g-a-lot d-a-n-urchoidibh fein 7 tic an-bás lé-soighdeoracht trí fuindeogaib mo cuirp .i. trí organaib mo cédfadh 7 an-fuil an-nech do-ní so in-molta an-æn-inad. Ma-sedh eist 7 cret do-n-neach adubairt .i. do-pol apstol an-doman do beith co-h-olc in-a tosach 7 an-a-bolgan 7 an-a-dered. 7 adeir

Adeir grigoir naem co-fagann an-corp dænna a-acfaind 7 a-ealadha amuich ac-fagbhail báis 7 a-contrardha so ar-ngabail na-bochtacht[a] ænda an-a-coiméttar an-corp 7 an-t-anam an-æn-inad ac-a-treorughadh do chum-flathamnais

Adeir ambrosius tabair t-aire re-beith bocht ar an-sægal so do-t-deoin óir is mór a-lúach ac-día 7 da-testaigedh maithes sægalta uait ní-teisteochait grasa 7 da-mbía do tech can-bethaidh 7 can beith lán do-toicti[2] tsægalta atá an-flathamnus acatt 7 do cuid do-n-talmain.

Oir adeir an-soscél mar-tsuidhfeas Christ a-teagais an-breithemnais cid bé neach do (fo 34d) roine séirgi re grad día 7 do dúisigh o chodladh na-caire a-fuireacras gradha na-bochtaine 7 do-treico a-sealba dilsi ar-grad día do gebatt breithemnus sær can-chunntabairt do-n ló deigenach ar-son an-ní do-rónsat.

Adeir grigoir co-tiucfatt so le Crist o-n-breithemnus .i. an drong ar-a-rucad droch-bretha ar-an-sægal so 7 do-fulaing co-foighdech iatt ar-gradh día can-scandail do-tabairt na-n-agaidh. 7 adeir

Adeir ieronmus ar-bochtacht Christ cur-cosmail Crist ris na-bochtaib an-étaigib crina athcaithti do cur uime 7 an-a-breith a-maindser an-asail 7 a-moran do docraib ele 7 d-a-derbadh so cach ní is-lé día is-leis na-bochtaib hé mar adeir an-soscél curab leis an-mbocht spiratalta an-flathamnus neamda. 7 adeir

Adeir matha sóscéluidhe i-sin VIII caibidil atat uamanda ac-na-sinnchibh 7 neit ac-na-h-enaib 7 ní fuil inatt a cind ac mac día sa-sægal so 7 d-a-derbadh sin ní-d-oighrecht dílis meic[3] día gradh an-tsægail na-a-anoir ac-tuicsin briatar an-tsoscéil a-timchill inaitt meic día. 7 adeir

[2] Probably the second *t* is meant for *c*.
[3] In these two words *t* is written for *c*.

Bede says:—"I am engaged in selling something, namely, the kingdom of God, and the price with which it is bought is true poverty, and bodily ills patiently [borne], both in joy and in toil, in affliction and in glory; for the true character of the following of God even into heaven is spiritual poverty."

Bede says:—"If thou hadst the wisdom of Solomon, and the beauty of Absalom, and the strength of Samson, and the stature of the son of the Giant,[9] and the wealth of Giezi (?),[10] and the power of Octavianus, and the swiftness of Asael (?),[11] what profit would that bring thee, if thou gavest thy body to worms and thy soul to the devil to be buried in hell with the covetous rich man who is called Tantalus, as the Gospel says[12] in another place."

Gregory says:—"Where is there anything more glorious than [monastic] poverty in which the kingdom of God is purchased, and where is there anything more ignominious than it when it is forsaken for love of the world, and where is there anything pleasanter than it when it receives the price of its hire, namely, the kingdom of God."

Gregory says:—[13] "I would like you to forsake for the love of the truth, the love of the world, since you will not be able to profit by it nor to bring it with you to the place whither you are going."

For the Philosopher says:—[14] "It pleaseth me not to apply the term 'good' to a hurtful thing, namely, the love of the world; and know that blessed is poverty in which the kingdom of God is got ready before thee, and in which the life of this world is found to be, as it were, a delay."

Gregory says:—[15] "O ye who love the world, ye are perforce leaving behind you your love, namely, temporal possessions, inasmuch as the salvation of God's kingdom is not visible to you through the dark cloud of the world."

[9] Cf. II Kings xxi, 20 (Vulgate).
[10] Cf. IV Kings v, 20 (Vulgate).
[11] Cf. II Kings ii, 18 (Vulgate).
[12] Cf. Matt. xvi, 26.
[13] Cf. *Hom.* xxxvii *in Evangelia*, par. 19, and *Expositiones in I Regum, Lib.* v, par. 13.
[14] St. Thomas Aquinas?
[15] For the latter part of the citation, cf. *Super Cantica Canticorum Expositio*, cap. viii, par. 10.

Adeir día fein sa-soscél cédna a-dæine lenus mé ac-iarraid antsægail ní raibi sé acam fein oir ní-roibe tech oighidhechta acam [4] and a-cuirfind mo cenn

Adeir matha sóscéluidhe sa IX caibidil X ar-fechain caich æn ní n-a-timchill do Crist .i. na-catrach [3] nemda [5] 7 an tsægail nachfuair inatt a-cuirfedh a-cenn acht a-craidhi an cristaidhi indraic a ænar 7

Adeir ad-cuirincios sa VIII madh caibidil ó do bí Crist saidbir and fein do rinde deoradh daidhbir de indaindi sa-sægal accomlinad toile an-atar

Adeir augustin ní abraim cur-bocht hé sa-sægal cidhead do gab bochtacht cuigi d-a-deoin 7 ni-treic a saidbris díada .i. a-trocaire mór do-n tæb astigh oir do bí bocht do-n-tæb amuich mar-duine ac-gabail eisimplara ar-slidhi-ne cuigi ac-a-foillsiughad fein bocht indus co lenmæisne (fo 35a) sa-slidhi cédna he oir do cuir deimbrig an-a-corp ac-a-caithem mar étach t-sætair ac-a-césad mar cennach oraindi ac-comlínad toile an-athar. Is mar sin dligmit-ne étach arsaigh na h-ainghidhechta do chur dinn 7 stoil na-h-aitrigi dogabail umaind .i. étach baindsi na bochtaine ac-leanmain Crist a-flathamnus a-toil an-athar cédna 7 is annsa-bochtacht so bías cach-æn-nech saidhbir o-lenmain Christ 7 is mar so lentar hé .i. cach æn tarcaisniges hé fein 7 do-ní bocht do reir cuirp de 7 saidbir n-a-cogcubus oir is millse codlus an-bocht an-a-ceirtib .i. san-umla na tigerna an-étaigh orda 7 na-bíd naire ort ac-iarraid deirci an-anoir an-tigerna oir is hé día do-múin duit hí mar-slidhi 7 tuc mar étach duit hí 7 mar sásad spiratalta 7 aimserda. 7

Adeir iob sa .IX. caibidil .X. ar .XX. ma-tá æn-tsalcar a-m lamhaib na-a-m-craidi ní abraim bocht spiratalta do día rium an-æn-inad ar-doman 7

Adeir grigoir is-iat atá an-a-mbochtaib spiratalta .i. na-dæine as-ar-teith a-spirat dimais 7 le nach olc beith easbadach sa-sægal ar grad an-maithis spiratalta 7 is doib sin geallaim-si flathamnus dé arsi Crist mar aderar sa-soscél curab leis na-bochtaib spiratalta an-flathamnus oir dligter urfuigell an boicht do-denam ar-tús roim cach uile tigerna an eisimplair Christ sa-breithemnus deigenach. oir adeir

Adeir Prouerbia sa-tres caibidil .XX. oscail do bel a-boicht

[4] The text has *and acam* with the usual signs to indicate an insertion.
[5] No doubt an error for *naemta*, which is translated.

Jerome says:—"A most acceptable knight in the sight of God is he who acquires the esteem of the world as he deems best, and wins the kingdom of God in the end."

The Philosopher says[14] says:—"If the world were made the certain possession of some one, then would the reign of peace and harmony exist among the brethren until going into the kingdom of God."

Cassiodorus says:—"I have an adversary going about me every day, namely, the world, which hems in my way in league with my enemies, namely, my five bodily senses, which defile it with their own iniquities; and death comes shooting his darts through the windows of my body, namely, through the organs of my senses; and is the one that does this to be praised in any way? Listen, then, and believe him who said [it], namely, Paul the Apostle, [who said] that the world is bad in its beginning and in its middle and in its end."

Saint Gregory says that the human body gives up its power and its skill on dying; and it is the contrary of this on embracing poverty in a community, whereby, in the one place, body and soul are kept directed towards heaven.

Ambrose says:—[16] "Give thy attention to being poor in this world voluntarily, for its worth is great in the sight of God, and should worldly goods be lacking to thee, graces will not be lacking, and though thy house should be without food, and not full of worldly treasure, thou hast heaven and thy share of the earth."

For the Gospel says:—[17] "When Christ will be seated in the house of judgment, whoever practised charity for the love of God, and awoke from the sleep of sin to the watchfulness of the love of poverty, and forsook their own possessions for the love of God, will doubtless receive a favorable judgment on the last day on account of what they have done."

Gregory says[18] that these will come with Christ from the judgment, namely, those against whom were given unjust judgments in this world, and who suffered them patiently for the love of God, without giving scandal against Him.

Jerome says, on the poverty of Christ, that Christ was like the poor in putting on old outworn garments and in being born in the

[15] *Hexaëmeron*, Lib. VI, cap. VIII, no. 52.

[17] Cf. Matt. X, 42; XXV, 35.

[18] Cf. *Moralium*, Lib. X, cap. XXXI.

spiratalta 7 is-í tuicsin an-tex so .i. na-breithemna do-tabairt na-mbocht d-a-n-aire ar-son día ac-denam a-cúisi doib o-nach etir leó fein a-denam 7 denaid-si an cert doib mar sin a breithemna. 7 adeir

Adeir iacob sa dara caibidil ma-s-é an-recht ríagalta do b-ail leat do congmail a-duine na-tarcaisnigh agaidh an-boicht spiratalta 7 agaidh an-dimsaigh do anorugadh oir ní bí deithbir ac-día itir nech tar a-cele ac-tabairt luach a-sætair dóib mar do tuilleadar 7 is-é recht día grasa do-tabairt do cach æn (fo 35b) do-reir a-gnima mar-tuilleas iatt sa sæghal

Adeir matha soscéluidhe sa V caibidil is conaich an-bocht spiratalta óir is leis an-flathamnus nemda 7 is-iat so na-dæine do-treicc a-ní fein 7 ac-a-fuil sealb caich æn-ní spiratalta 7 is-amlaidh tuices bernard an-bocht spiratalta curab-í an-umla is buime d-a-spiratalt*acht* mar adeir an-t-udaras curab-í tús cach uile ecna ecla día 7 is mar sin is-í tús cach uile næmtacht[a] lenmain día sa-bochtacht spiratalta mar adubramar 7 is aire so atait na boicht spiratalta in-tohgtha an-a-prelaidi ac-coimét an-rechta spiratalta.

Adeir iacob i-sin dara caibidil eistidh rium a-braithrecha 7 coimetaigh co-dútrachtach a-n-abraim rib óir ní híat lucht an-tsaidbris tsægalta is-ferr a-fiadni día sa-breithemnus deigenach curab aire sin nach-fuilitt siatt in-toghtha do coimét anma caich óir ní coimetait a-n-anam fein ar gradh an-tsægail 7 is-uime sin atat na-boicht spiratalta toghtha ar-a-febus coimétaitt a-n-anmanna fein ar gradh día 7 ar-fuath an-tsægail dimbúain. 7 adbar ele ar-son nach-gabaid a-luaidhidhecht ar in sægal ac-fuireach re grasaib día mar a-ndentar solás úasal dóib ac-gabáil a-sochair a-mbreithemnus día curab aire sin cid bé thógas an saidbir ar-a saidbris 7 diúltas an-bocht spiratalta ar a-bochtacht do-pecfadh co-follus a-ndía 7 a-nduine quí uiuit ac ragnat deus per omnia secula ceclorum. Amen FINIT Amen.

manger of the ass, and in many other hardships. And to confirm this, "Everything that God has belongs to the poor," as the Gospel says [19] that "the kingdom of heaven belongs to the poor in spirit."

Matthew the Evangelist says in the eighth chapter:—[20] "The foxes have holes and the birds have nests, but the Son of God has not a place for His head in this world," and this is to prove that it is not a part of the true heritage of a child of God to possess the love of the world nor its honor, understanding the words of the Gospel concerning the place of the Son of God.

And God Himself says, in the same Gospel:—[21] "O ye who follow me, and are seeking the world, I had it not myself, for I had no place of shelter therein where I might lay my head."

Matthew the Evangelist says in the nineteenth chapter,[22] on Christ's looking at everything around Him, namely, the holy [23] city, and the world, that He found no place to lay His head but in the heart of the upright Christian alone.

Ad Corinthios says in the eighth chapter:—[24] "Since Christ was rich in Himself, He made a poor exile of Himself among us in the world, fulfilling the will of the Father."

Augustine says:—"I do not say that He was poor in the world although he embraced poverty voluntarily, seeing that He did not abandon His divine riches, namely, His great mercy within; for He was poor externally, as man, taking on Himself the similitude of our manner of life, showing Himself poor so that we might follow Him in the same way." For he put weakness in His body, wearing it as working-clothes in His crucifixion as a ransom for us, fulfilling the will of the Father. It is thus that we ought to put off the old garment of wickedness and take upon us the robe of penitence, namely, the wedding garment of poverty, following Christ into heaven in the will of the same Father. And it is in this poverty that each one is rich from the following of Christ; and it is thus He is followed, namely, everyone that despiseth himself and maketh himself poor according to the body, and rich in his conscience. For the poor man sleeps more sweetly in his

[19] Matt. v, 3. [20] Verse 20.

[21] Apparently referring to the same passage.

[22] Perhaps a thought drawn from some commentary on vv. 27 to 29, on leaving all things to follow Christ.

[23] See note (5) in text. MS. has "heavenly."

[24] II Cor. VIII, 9.

rags, that is, in his humility, than a lord in cloth of gold. And be not ashamed of asking alms in honor of the Lord, for it is God who taught thee it as a way of life, and gave it to thee as a garment, and as a spiritual and temporal solace.

Job says in the thirty-ninth chapter:—[25] "If there is any uncleanness in my hands or in my heart, I do not call myself a man who is spiritually poor for God's sake in any way whatever."

Gregory says:—[26] "These are the poor in spirit, namely, those from whom their spirit of pride has gone out, and who do not dislike being in want in the world for love of spiritual good." "And it is to these I promise the kingdom of God," said Christ; as it is said in the Gospel [27] that "heaven is of the poor in spirit." For it is fitting that the judgment of the poor man should be given first before every lord, after the example of Christ in the last judgment. For Proverbs says in the twenty-third chapter:—[28] "Open your mouth, ye poor in spirit"; and the meaning of this text is, that judges should take notice of the poor for God's sake, espousing their cause since they are not able to do so themselves; "and do justice to them therefore, ye judges."

And James says in the second chapter:—[29] "If thou wishest to keep the royal law, O man, do not despise the face of him who is poor in spirit, and honor the face of the proud man"; for there is no difference between men before God in giving them the reward of their labor as they have merited. And the law of God is to give graces to each one according to his works as he deserves them in the world.

Matthew the Evangelist says in the fifth chapter:—[27] "Blessed is the poor in spirit, for the heavenly kingdom is his"; and these are they who have forsaken their all, and who have possession of every spiritual thing. And thus Bernard [30] understands the poor in spirit, that humility is the nurse of his spirituality, as the Authority says [31] that "the fear of God is the beginning of

[25] Perhaps from a commentary on Job. The first part resembles xxxi, 7.

[26] Cf. *Moralium*, Lib. xxi, par. 25. But the same thought is found frequently.

[27] Matt. v, 3.

[28] The reference is evidently mistaken. Cf. xxxi, 9.

[29] James ii, 2-8.

[30] Cf. B. Guerrici Abbatis, *Serm. in Solemn. SS. OO., l. c.* Cf. also Bernard, *Lib. de Modo Bene Vivendi*, par. 112. But the text follows the former more closely.

[31] Ps. cx, 10. Prov. i, 7.

wisdom"; and thus the following of God in poverty of spirit is the beginning of all holiness, as we have said. And it is for this reason that the poor in spirit are fit to be chosen as prelates to maintain the spiritual law. James says in the second chapter:—[32] "Hearken to me, brethren, and keep faithfully what I say to you, for it is not those who have earthly riches who are best in the presence of God in the last judgment." Hence for that reason they are not fit to be chosen to keep the souls of all, for they do not keep their own souls because of love of the world. And therefore the poor in spirit are chosen, for the perfection with which they keep their own souls for the love of God, and for hatred of the passing world. And another reason is, because they do not take their reward in the world while waiting for the graces of God, when a noble comfort is given them, taking their ease in the judgment of God. So that it is for that reason that whoever receives the rich man on account of his riches and refuses the poor of spirit on account of his poverty, would sin [33] manifestly against God and man—qui vivit ac regnat Deus per omnia sæcula sæculorum. Amen. Finit. Amen.

JAMES A. GEARY.

[32] Cf. verse 5.

[33] James II, 2, 3, 9.

Notable Gift to the Library.

Catalogue of the Manuscripts and Early Printed Books . . . . now forming Portion of the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan. Four volumes. London, 1906–7.

This beautiful set of four quarto volumes printed for private distribution is number one hundred of an edition confined to five copies printed on vellum and one hundred and seventy copies on paper. It comes as a gift from the library of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan.

No description can do justice to the beauty and artistic excellence of the workmanship of these volumes. The medieval woodcuts, the ornamental initials, the miniatures and the samples of manuscript work reproduce the originals with a skill and taste that leave nothing to be desired. Students who, either indirectly, through their interest in Church History, Ecclesiastical Liturgy or ecclesiastical art, or directly through their study of the bibliography of early printed books and medieval manuscripts, have acquired an appreciation of the art of beautiful bookmaking will enjoy and profit by the study of these volumes. In the fourth volume, especially, the student of ecclesiastical liturgy and ecclesiastical art will find many beautiful miniatures and illuminated pages which will, in default of the originals, give him an opportunity to study the Psalters, Books of Hours, etc., which form an interesting chapter in his studies. The detailed descriptions of contents and of marginal notes are valuable especially to the historian. As an example one may select the Kildare "Book of Hours," described Volume IV, 139 ff., on the margins of which are several inscriptions, here quoted, referring to the family history of the celebrated Fitzgeralds, Earls of Kildare. Among the manuscripts described and illustrated are several "Bestiaries," a treatise on Chess, texts of the "Roman de la Rose," a curious work "Of the Government of Health," etc.

RIGHT REVEREND AUSTIN DOWLING.

In elevating Father Dowling, Rector of the Cathedral of Providence, Rhode Island, to the new See of Des Moines, Iowa, the Holy See has once more honored the alumni of the Catholic University of America. Austin Dowling was born in New York City, received his education at the Sisters' Academy, Newport, R. I., and at Manhattan College, New York. He made his theological studies at Brighton Seminary, Boston. In 1890, he entered the University as a post-graduate student of theology, and was ordained priest at Providence in June, 1891. In 1892 he obtained the degree of S. T. L. His first appointment was to the Sacred Heart Church of Providence. Two years later he went to Brighton Seminary where, for four years he taught Ecclesiastical History. Later, he spent two years as editor of the *Providence Visitor*, and was successively assistant at St. Joseph's, Providence, Pastor of St. Mary's, Warren, and Rector of the Providence Cathedral. As an editor, a preacher, a lecturer and a devoted pastor, he reflected credit on the University, and his friends and admirers were not at all surprised when his talents were recognized by his appointment to the See of Des Moines. His former professors, his fellow-students at the University, his fellow-alumni, and the editorial staff of the *Bulletin* to which he was an occasional contributor, wish him a long and successful career as chief pastor of the Diocese to which he has been called.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures. The Winter Course of Public Lectures at McMahon Hall on Thursday afternoons is attracting a good deal of attention this year. On February 15 Mr. John M. Gitterman lectured on "The Footsteps of Dante in Northern Italy." On Washington's Birthday the lecture was given by Hon. Hannis Taylor, LL. D., who chose for his subject "George Washington and the American Constitution." The following are the remaining dates and subjects: Feb. 29, "Life and Labors of Father Theobald Matthew," Rev. Walter Shanley, LL. D.; March 7, "St. Thomas Aquinas," Very Rev. Edward A. Pace, Ph. D.; March 14, "Plain Chant," Rev. Abel Gabert.

Debating Society. On February 7 the Shahan Debating Society held its annual Prize Debate, for the Cash Prize of Seventy-five Dollars presented by the Right Rev. Rector. The subject was "Resolved: That a tariff sufficient to offset the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad is desirable." On the Affirmative were Patrick F. Kerby, South Dakota; William C. Walsh, Maryland; Eugene M. Dwyer, New York. On the Negative side, John T. Clancy, New York; John L. Finn; Pennsylvania; Thomas R. Robinson, Washington, D. C. The Judges, Rev. William Turner, Professor of Logic, Dr. John C. French, of Johns Hopkins, and Hon. David J. Lewis, Representative in the House of Congress from Maryland, unanimously decided in favor of the Negative.

New Instructors. Two new instructors have been appointed in the Faculty of Law. Mr. Peter J. McLaughlin, A. B., Holy Cross (1895), LL. B., Georgetown, 1897, LL. M., Georgetown, 1898, has been appointed to teach Equity and Agency, and Mr. Walter B. Kennedy, A. B., Holy Cross, 1906, LL. B., Harvard Law School, 1909, has been appointed to teach Sales and Negotiable Instruments. Both, until their appointment, were prac-

tising lawyers at Worcester, Mass. Owing to the death of Judge William C. Robinson, Dean of the Faculty of Law, the Faculty was reorganized on February 9: Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan was appointed Acting-Dean, Professor Peter J. McLaughlin, Vice-Dean and Professor Ammi Brown, Secretary.

Department of Architecture. The first semi-annual exhibit of the work of the Department of Architecture was held last week in MacMahon Hall and an opportunity was afforded the public of viewing the results of the half-year's work in free-hand Drawing, Water Color, Design and Construction. The exhibit was arranged by Mr. Fred V. Murphy, Instructor in Architecture. It gave evidence of exceptional ability on the part of some of the students in the various branches taught in the department. The students exhibiting were: Messrs. Baum, Beall, Haaren, Baumer, Ball, Robinson, O'Neill, Murphy, McGill, McManus, Baltzley, Cronin and Druhan.

Department of Egyptology. Professor Henry Hyvernat, head of the Department of Assyriology and Egyptology is at present in Egypt in the interests of the important collection of Coptic Manuscripts henceforth to be known as the *Pierpont Morgan Collection.* He has already made a preliminary examination of the collection and pronounced it "the most complete, and, from the point of view of Christian art, the most valuable yet known." It comprises some fifty volumes, consisting chiefly of biblical manuscripts and early ecclesiastical literature. These are now in the Library of Mr. Morgan in New York. Dr. Hyvernat shares with M. Chassinat, Head of the French Institute of Archæology at Cairo, the credit of having assembled and completed the collection, a task which was accomplished only after six months of labor, and at the frequent risk of the life of the Cairo scholar. Dr. Hyvernat hopes soon after his return to America next summer to go over the collection more carefully and lay before the learned world the rich treasures of biblical, linguistic and historical lore which it contains.

The Library. The Library has just received from the Library of Mr. Pierpont Morgan four beautiful volumes containing a list of the manuscripts and early printed books now in Mr. Morgan's collection. The set is number 100 of an edition confined to five copies on vellum and one hundred and seventy-five copies on paper. The reproductions of medieval woodcuts, miniatures, and ornamented script are exceptionally beautiful, and the descriptive notes are most valuable for the student of early bibliography. The class in Library methods during the Summer Session will find this an interesting and useful contribution to the department of bibliography in the Library which has already reached the point where it may claim to be one of the most complete and systematic in the country. The department is especially strong in the bibliography of *incunabula,* and other early printed books.